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THE LAWYER DOTH PROTEST TOO MUCH, METHINKS: 
RECONSIDERING THE CONTEMPORANEOUS
OBJECTION 
REQUIREMENT IN DEPOSITIONS
E. Stewart Moritz*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The time has come to eliminate the contemporaneous objection
requirement for depositions.
From the original 1938 framing of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Rules) to the present, no one has recognized that the theory behind the
contemporaneous objection rule in depositions, as drawn from pre-Rules
equity practice, does not match the function of depositions in our post-
Rules system of open discovery.  Pre-Rules depositions in the federal
courts were exclusively testimony-preservation devices, and never
discovery tools, and the common law and statutory procedural rules for
pre-Rules depositions, including the contemporaneous objection rule,
reflected this use.1  But when the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
converted depositions into primarily fact-discovery devices,2 the older
procedural rules were incorporated into the new Rules, nearly wholesale,
and without consideration—and there they remain.
In the last ten years, perceived problems with deposition practice have
resulted in a number of modifications to the discovery rules, as well as
other proposals to curb aggressive use of objections in depositions.3
Before 1993, in the federal civil system, the Rules did not specify the
manner in which deposition objections were to be made, which led to a
chorus of commentators decrying the prevalence of “speaking” and
“coaching” objections.4  Revisions in 1993 to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for the first time required deposition objections to be made
“concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner.”5  In
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6. See infra Part V.A.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d).
8. The rule requiring objections to be made during a deposition upon penalty of waiver is the pretrial
discovery analogue of the “contemporaneous objection rule” of trial practice, which holds that objections not
made when grounds originally arise at trial may not be later raised on appeal.  In this Article, I adopt the trial
term for the rule, although I am only concerned with its use in the deposition context.
9. See, e.g., Kent Sinclair, Sinclair on Federal Civil Practice § 10.23 (PLI 2001) (“The witness should also be
told about objections, and instructed not to answer questions so rapidly that there is not time to raise an
objection.”);  Laura W. Smalley, Automobile Airbag Malfunction Litigation:  Practice and Strategy, 83 AM. JUR. Trials 1
§ 68-69, at 102 (2003) (“Witnesses should be instructed to pause briefly after each question asked, wait for an
objection, and seek clarification if the question is not clear.”).  Indeed, many an attorney in litigation practice has
a “war story” involving reminders administered to witness shin by lawyer foot.  I include this “non-academic”
example in the introductory section of this Article to make a point:  something that is easily understood by a
young litigator seems to have escaped the consideration of the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I argue here that the theory underlying the current function of depositions—which are primarily discovery, rather
1999, the Texas state courts went so far as to limit all objections to
deposition questions to two words, either “Objection, leading” or
“Objection, form.”6
However, all of these modifications and proposals share the pathology
of the original Rules:  they fail to recognize the theoretical disconnect
between antiquated testimony-preservation-focused procedural rules and
the now-primary use of depositions as fact-discovery devices.  Thus, the
proposals have focused on treating “discovery abuse,” rather than
addressing the real problem, which is a fundamental misconception of the
proper, less-adversarial role of attorneys in depositions.  Rather than issue
prescriptions that treat the symptoms, surgical elimination of the contem-
poraneous objection rule will address the disease, and finally bring
deposition practice into line with the theory of open discovery upon which
its modern incarnation is based.
***
A young civil litigator quickly learns that an objection to a question
posed in a deposition usually will be waived unless the objection is raised
prior to the time that the witness responds.7  More colloquially, the rule of
the deposition objection is simply “Use it, or lose it.”
Shortly after discovering this “contemporaneous objection rule,”8 the
new lawyer realizes, or is taught, that objections can be, and often are, used
for more than ensuring the clarity of deposition questions.  Rather, as part
of the “hide the ball” mentality that many believe pervades modern civil
litigation, deposition objections become another tool to be used in keeping
information from the opposing party to the case.  A basic admonition
during any preparation of a witness for deposition follows the lines of:
“Pause before you answer any question, in order to give me time to object.
If I object, be extra careful in answering the question, which may be tricky
or get at a particularly sensitive area.”9
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than testimony-preservation tools—requires a different role for witness counsel.
10. See, e.g., Bah. Agric. Indus. v. Riley Stoker Corp., 526 F.2d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir. 1975) (cited in notes
to USCS Rule 32) (“The focus of [Rule 32] is on the necessity of making the objection at a point . . . where it
will be of some value in curing the alleged error in the deposition. . . .  It is important that objections be made
during the process of taking the deposition, so that the deposition retains some use at . . . trial;  otherwise
counsel would be encouraged to wait until trial before making any objections, with the hope that the testimony,
although relevant, would be excluded altogether because of the manner in which it was elicited.”).
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 86(a).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d)(3)(B).  Objections that might be cured, and thus must be raised, most typically
involve the form of the question—for example, that it is leading, ambiguous, compound, vague, or
argumentative.
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note (1937).
The theory behind the imposition of the contemporaneous objection
rule in depositions is not self-evident.  The reasons that might be advanced
for the rule are similar to those made for the contemporaneous objection
rule in the trial context.  For example, the contemporaneous objection rule
in either the trial or deposition context seeks to:  (1) preserve court
resources and promote finality by eliminating from further consideration
those objections that are not important enough to be made at the time they
are raised;  (2) allow the examining attorney to correct mistakes, thereby
encouraging the discovery and use of all relevant facts and decreasing “trial
by ambush” and later suppression of information “on technicalities;”  (3)
prevent an attorney who is unprepared or unaware at the time an error is
made from profiting from his or her own failure by closely reading the
examination transcript and raising the error subsequently;  and (4) give
primacy to the live event, where context can be more easily judged, over
later second-guessing using only dry textual sources.10  But in actual fact,
the incorporation of the contemporaneous objection rule into the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is not based on any reason;  rather, it is an
historical anomaly.
The contemporaneous objection rule for civil depositions comes directly
from original Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect September 1, 1938.11  The rule is now found in Rule 32(d), which
mirrors the original language and in pertinent part states that
Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner
of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the
oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of parties, and errors of any kind
which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly presented, are
waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the
deposition.12
The perfunctory 1937 Advisory Committee note to Rule 32 points out
only that “[t]his rule is in accordance with common practice.”13
As this Article details, however, the “common” deposition practice to
which the Advisory Committee text refers was not particularly common
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14. The author adopts the academician’s typical focus on federal, rather than state, procedural rules,
primarily for the benefits gained from examining a uniform system but also with the knowledge that it is far
more difficult to coherently trace the labyrinthine developments of multi-state civil procedure.  Happily, as I
explore below in Part II.B, in the case of deposition rules, innovative state discovery experiments of the
nineteenth century were for the most part adopted in the Federal Rules of 1938, and most states have since
at the time.  Nor was pre-1938 practice at all similar to current deposition
practice in federal civil cases.  Because pretrial practice as it exists today is
so far removed from the historical analogues on which it was based, and
from any vision then of what pretrial practice might become, we have
good reason to reexamine the basis and usefulness of the contemporane-
ous objection rule.
This Article begins by tracing the history of deposition procedure in the
United States and showing the sea change that came with enactment of the
Federal Rules in 1938, turning depositions into a front-line discovery tool.
The Article shows that, despite this fundamental shift, the procedural rules
for lawyer and witness conduct during depositions did not change, but
rather followed the traditional rules more suited to trial testimony and the
original and exclusive use of depositions as a means of preserving proof
offered by witnesses who might become unavailable at trial.  The Article
then considers whether the early Rules’ stated theory of broad discovery
should have led to different procedural rules for the conduct of deposi-
tions, and compares depositions to other fact-finding fora, including grand
juries, congressional and administrative agency hearings, and courts in the
German civil-law system.  In particular, the Article explores why many of
these fora have significantly different rules for lawyer attendance and
conduct in witness interviews and investigative hearings—where fact-
gathering, rather than evidence preservation, is the acknowledged goal of
the proceeding.
Finally, the Article makes a proposal for modifying the rules of
deposition administration by eliminating the “contemporaneous obstruc-
tion rule” (as the contemporaneous objection rule might better be known),
based on the frank recognition that in an age when only one in twenty
federal cases is disposed of by trial, depositions are almost exclusively a
discovery tool.  Although the proposal is not offered to directly ameliorate
abusive deposition conduct by lawyers, it might.  In addition, it will help
practitioners reconstruct their roles in the discovery process to advance the
open discovery system upon which the Rules originally were predicated,
in a way that does not contravene the “proportional discovery” trend of
recent Rules revisions.
II.  EVOLUTION OF DEPOSITION PROCEDURE IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS14 
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revised their discovery (and hence deposition) rules to conform with federal practice.  See Michael E. Wolfson,
Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 35 (1988).  Thus, except for the timing
of the adoption of specific rules, which concededly has varied widely, state and federal deposition practices have
largely tracked each other in their evolution.
On the importance, generally, of the study of pre-Rules history to the understanding of current
procedural issues, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Influence of History on Procedure:  Volumes of Logic, Scant Pages of History,
50 OHIO ST. L.J. 803, 803 (1989) (a “rumination on the importance of being historical for proceduralists”).
15. 1st Cong., Sess. 1, Ch. 20, § 30 (1789), 1 Stat. 88.
16. Pre-Rules federal deposition procedures are discussed in detail immediately infra.
17. Professor Edson R. Sunderland, a member of the first Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the
Judicial Conference (the “Committee” or “Advisory Committee”), and in that capacity the drafter of Rules 26
to 37 of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, set out his view of the importance of deposition discovery
five years before the Rules’ promulgation:  “if discovery is to involve a thorough inquiry into the vital and highly
controversial phases of the case, resort must be had to an oral examination.”  Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and
Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 874-77 (1933). 
18. One commentator at the time of the Rules’ passage opined, “The new procedure introduces nothing
new in the way of ‘procedural conceptions’ insofar as concerns the actual taking of depositions.”  STANLEY F.
BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 607, at 346.
19. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed:  The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery
Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 692 (1998) (“What is perhaps most surprising in the public debate among those who
most vigorously fought for and against the Enabling Act is the insignificance of discovery issues.”).  See generally
id.
From the passage of the first Judiciary Act in 178915 to the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, provisions governing civil
depositions in the federal courts remained essentially unchanged.
Depositions were very rarely used, and then only to preserve testimony in
certain narrow circumstances.16
With the coming of the Rules, however, deposition practice changed
radically.  Depositions became an essential tool—perhaps the essential
tool—of pre-trial discovery.17  The new deposition procedure far
outstripped its traditional antecedents in availability, ease of use, and
breadth of inquiry.
Despite the Rules’ radical reconception of the deposition as a fact-
discovery device—and in stark contrast to fundamental changes in the
rules governing when depositions could be taken and how depositions
subsequently might be used—the basic rules for the administration of the
deposition proceeding itself did not change from pre-1938 practice.18
Instead, the Rules incorporated then-existing statutory and common-law
rules of deposition conduct, with little apparent consideration19 that such
rules might be more suited to the original and exclusive use of deposi-
tions—as a means of preserving proof offered by witnesses who might
become unavailable at trial—than to the use of depositions as a discovery
device.
Many of these traditional deposition conduct rules—for example, the
swearing of the witness prior to taking testimony—seem to prefer neither
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20. Swearing the witness largely provides a formality that reminds the witness of the legal nature of the
proceeding.  While derived directly from the deposition’s testimony-preserving history and formally serving the
preservation function, swearing does not enhance preservation at the expense of discovery.  Indeed, reminding
the witness of the formality of the proceeding should aid discovery for the same reasons that it is thought to aid
the preservation of accurate testimony.
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1938) (modified 1970) (stating that testimony of any person may be taken
“for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes”).
22. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983) (finding it unsurprising, given the “adversary
tradition and the current discovery Rules,” that “many opportunities, if not incentives” for discovery abuse are
afforded by the Rules, and that the spirit of the Rules is violated when “advocates attempt to use discovery tools
as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues by . . . unnecessary use of defensive
weapons or evasive responses”).
23. Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1436-37 (1984) (“Even in the aggregate, however, the
federal statutes did not provide complete federal rules of civil or criminal procedure.  Instead, Congress directed
the federal courts to follow local procedure and practice on most matters not addressed by specific federal
legislation.  Uniform federal rules of procedure existed only for cases in admiralty and equity, where conformity
to state practice was not feasible.  Pursuant to express statutory authority the Supreme Court adopted rules of
equity in 1822 and rules of admiralty in 1844.”).
24. Id. at 1437 & n.21.
25. Actually, not just deposition discovery, but all forms of discovery were unavailable on the law, as
opposed to equity, side of the federal system.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 633 (1988) (citation omitted) (“So far as pretrial discovery is
fact-gathering nor testimony-preserving,20 which are the twin aims of post-
Rules’ deposition procedure.21  However, other conduct rules may not be
so neutral, at least in application.  The contemporaneous objection rule, in
particular, unquestionably favors the formality of testimony preservation
over the practicality of fact gathering—the possibility, not to mention the
requirement, of making non-privilege objections during a witness’s
testimony allows lawyers defending depositions to interrupt the flow of
questioning and shape the witness’s responses.22  The detailed review
below of the background of the current deposition rules starts us on the
path to reconsidering the contemporaneous objection rule.
A.  Pre-Rules Procedure
Prior to the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
there was no comprehensive federal civil procedure.  Instead, through the
years, Congress adopted a variety of statutes that set forth the basic
procedural rules for the federal courts.23  Where Congress did not speak
on a procedural issue, the federal courts were directed to follow local state
rules.24 
1.  Availability and Types of Depositions
Under this pre-Rules regime, deposition discovery was essentially
unavailable in the federal system.25  Depositions were allowed at law and
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concerned, the old regime’s approach depended on whether the case was at law or was in equity.  The policy of
the common law concerning discovery, until statutory reforms beginning in the early 20th Century, was very
clear:  There was none.  Hence, a party could prosecute an action at law only on the basis of what evidence she
might have ‘in the file’ or which she could obtain by self-help investigation.”).  See also Dan Downey & Lori
Massey, Discoverectomy II:  The End of “Gotcha” Litigation, 13 REV. LITIG. 183, 185 n.7 (1994) (quoting 1 WALTER
JORDAN, MODERN TEXAS DISCOVERY § 1.01, at 2 (1974)) (“Before 1941, there were neither rules of civil
procedure nor statutes specifically designed to provide litigants with the means of discovering pertinent
information in the possession of their adversary or third parties.”).
26. Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 117 n.1 (1949);
Note, Foreign Depositions Practice in American Civil Suits—A Judicial Stepchild, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 244 (1947)
[hereinafter Foreign Depositions].
27. James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure:  I, 38 COLUM. L. REV.
1179, 1181-83 (1938) (“The [pre-Rules] deposition procedure was so limited that it was not available to any
appreciable extent for [discovery].”); id. at 1190.  See also 3 GUSTUVUS OHLINGER, JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN CIVIL ACTIONS 415 (rev. ed. 1964) (depositions limited
to obtaining evidence, as distinguished from discovery) (collecting cases).
28. Rev. Stat. § 861 (1875).  The 1912 Equity Rules similarly required testimony to generally be taken
orally in open court, FED. EQ. R. 46 (1912), 226 U.S. 631, 661 (1912), as did the Admiralty Rules.  See P.S. DYER-
SMITH, FEDERAL EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL AND DEPOSITION PRACTICE AT HOME AND ABROAD § 695,
at 447 (1939).
29. The general deposition statutes, discussed infra, applied at common law, and, except for certain minor
provisions concerning timing of the deposition, in equity proceedings.  3 GEORGE FOSTER LONGSDORF,
CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 985, 986, at 928-30 (1928);  Audiffren
Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F. 783 (D. N.J. 1917).  See, e.g., FED. EQ. R. 54 (1912), 226 U.S.
631, 664 (1912) (providing that depositions “may be taken as provided by sections 863, 865, 866 and 867,
Revised Statutes”), replacing former FED. EQ. R. 68 (1842), 42 U.S. xli, lxi (1842).  The Equity Rules also
provided for non-statutory depositions, for “good and exceptional cause,” see FED. EQ. R. 47 (1912) (when
allowed by statute or for cause, depositions of witnesses allowed), replacing former FED. EQ. R. 67 (1842), but
they were of the same forms as the statutory depositions, the only difference being that certain courts in equity
were more flexible in allowing the depositions if both parties agreed.  See Subrin, supra note 19, at 699-700.  Even
if allowed more frequently by some courts, Equity Rule 47 depositions were for preserving proof, not obtaining
discovery.  Id.
30. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 544, at 746.  Letters rogatory were also available to take testimony
from witnesses abroad, id. at 746-47, but this transnational deposition device, still available in certain situations,
is beyond the scope of this Article.
equity, in a few narrowly circumscribed situations virtually unchanged
since the Judiciary Act of 1789,26 but each of these early deposition forms
were intended to allow parties, or prospective parties, to preserve testimony of
potentially unavailable witnesses, rather than to allow litigants to discover
information about their own or the opposing party’s case.27  Under the pre-
Rules statutory procedural framework, the “mode of proof” in federal trial
of civil actions was “by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in
open court,” except as otherwise provided by statute.28  Depositions
existed only as an exception to this rule requiring live-witness proof.
Four basic kinds of testimony-preservation depositions were statutorily
authorized in pre-Rules federal law and equity courts:29  depositions de bene
esse, depositions under dedimus potestatem, depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam, and depositions “in the mode prescribed by state laws.”30  While
these different deposition forms each evolved separately from English
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31. Foreign Depositions, supra note 26, at 242.  See also 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 534, at 747
(deposition de bene esse is one taken “conditionally or provisionally, where there is danger of losing the testimony
of an important witness otherwise, but not to be used if he be alive and available at the trial”).
32. Rev. Stat. § 863 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934).  For a comprehensive discussion of pre-Rules
deposition practice, see generally 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, §§ 534–572, at 746-826.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934) (specifying either a federal court judge or district court clerk, a state judge or
chancellor, a city mayor or chief magistrate, or a notary public).
34. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 544, at 764.  A subpoena duces tecum could also be issued to require
production of documents at the deposition, but required a court order and only applied to a narrow range of
documents that could be said to be competent and material evidence in the case.  Id. at 764-65;  United States
v. Tilden, 28 F. Cas. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 16,522).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 641 (1934);  Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U.S. 522 (1886).
36. Rev. Stat. § 866 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934).  The dedimus was also available in equity.  See 2
LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 549, at 774; FED. EQ. R. 54 (1912).
equity practice, in federal court practice of the early twentieth century they
were in many ways similar in application.
a.  Depositions De Bene Esse
The most common deposition device was the de bene esse deposition, or
deposition by notice, available where either party was concerned that a
given witness would not be available at trial.31  The applicable federal
statute listed the several specific instances, after the facts of a case were at
issue, in which the de bene esse would obtain:  when a witness, either a party
to the case or a third party, lived or planned to travel more than 100 miles
from the place of trial;  was about to leave the United States;  was bound
on a voyage to sea;  or was aged and infirm.32  The de bene esse deposition
did not require action by a court, but instead was initiated by the party
proposing the deposition, by providing reasonable notice in writing to the
opposing party or attorney.  The deposition could be taken before one of
the several types of neutral officers authorized by the statute,33 and the
subpoena power of the court was available to compel witness attendance.34
If at the time of trial the judge or chancellor was not satisfied that the
witness was absent or infirm, the deposition could not be used.35
b.  Depositions Under Dedimus Potestatem
Depositions under dedimus potestatem, or by commission, unlike those de
bene esse, required intervention of a court before they could be taken.  For
this reason, perhaps, the statutory grounds for taking a deposition under
a dedimus were considerably less well-defined, allowing a commission to
issue “[i]n any case where it is necessary, in order to prevent a failure or
delay of justice.”36  Nonetheless, in deciding when a dedimus was “neces-
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37. Foreign Depositions, supra note 26, at 242-43 & n.13 (“It would seem, therefore, that the difference
between the grounds required for these two types of depositions lies in the greater discretion of the court in
issuing a dedimus.”);  Pike & Willis, supra note 27, at 1181.
38. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 550, at 775 n.32.
39. Subrin, supra note 19, at 699.
40. Foreign Depositions, supra note 26, at 242-43.  Indeed, the 1928 Longsdorf treatise has trouble
distinguishing the uses of the devices at all.  In one of the treatise’s more amusing, if not entirely helpful,
passages, Longsdorf states:  “In choosing whether to take depositions de bene esse or by commission, it should
be remembered that the former method is in derogation of common law and therefore is construed accordingly,
while the latter method has been pronounced cumbersome, dilatory and expensive.”  2 LONGSDORF, supra note
29, § 534, at 747.  But see 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 214, at 363-64
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (dedimus available where de bene esse did not apply because witness was
outside the country).
41. The deposition in perpetuam is preserved in main part in Rule 27, which allows a prospective litigant
to preserve testimony.  FED. R. CIV. P. 27.  Like the equity practice, Rule 27 is not intended to function as a
discovery device, but instead requires that the petitioner set forth in some detail the substance of the testimony
to be preserved.  See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 27.03 (2003) (“Insisting that
a petitioner describe the testimony that is to be perpetuated deprives Rule 27 of practical utility as a general
discovery device, thereby guarding against surrogate efforts to obtain discovery.”).
42. Rev. Stat. § 866 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 644 (1934) (“any district court, upon application to it as a court
of equity, may, according to the usages of chancery, direct depositions to be taken in perpetuam rei memoriam”).
See generally 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 559, at 798-800.  In addition, a federal court could admit into
evidence “any deposition taken in perpetuam rei memoriam, which would be so admissible in a court of the State
wherein such cause is pending, according to the laws thereof.”  28 U.S.C. § 645 (1934).
sary,” courts generally looked to the same types of contingencies that
conditioned the use of a de bene esse.37
Like a deposition by notice, a deposition by commission was not
available prior to “the joining of issues” in a case, brought about by
defendant’s filing of an answer to the complaint.38  In addition, to receive
a commission, a party needed to show that the witness was beyond the
reach of the court’s process, that the testimony could not be taken
pursuant to notice, and that the application was made in good faith and
not merely for discovery purposes.39  The main differences in depositions
taken under notice or by commission, other than the greater discretion
granted the trial court under the dedimus statute, were that a commission
could be used to secure a deposition abroad, and that a deposition taken
under a commission could be used at trial regardless of the availability of
the witness.40
c.  Depositions In Perpetuam Rei Memoriam
Unlike either the de bene esse or dedimus, a deposition in perpetuam rei
memoriam was available only before the accrual of a potential litigant’s right
of action at law.41  When it appeared that a witness would be unavailable
to testify in a subsequently filed action, a separate action in perpetuam could
be brought in equity to preserve the testimony,42 such action to be
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43. Pike & Willis, supra note 27, at 1183 (“usages” in statute refer to those of English chancery).
44. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 559, at 798.
45. 27 Stat. 7, c. 14 (1892), 28 U.S.C. § 643 (1934).  This “Act of March 9, 1892” was one of four
nineteenth century acts that attempted “to simplify procedure by allowing or requiring local state practice to be
followed in certain phases of actions in the federal courts.” Foreign Depositions, supra note 26, at 246.  See also Rev.
Stat. § 914 (1875) (“Conformity Act”);  Rev. Stat. § 721 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 725 (1940) (“Rules of Decision Act”);
and Rev. Stat. § 858 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1940) (“Competency of Witnesses Act”).  For a good explanation
of the conformity legislation, see DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 707, at 451.
46. See Pike & Willis, supra note 27, at 1185 (quite common in state law to allow deposition of party
without showing of non-availability at trial;  California use of party-deposition as discovery).  Id. at 1189-90.
47. Foreign Depositions, supra note 26, at 247.
48. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 558, at 798.
49. See 3 OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 415 (pre-Rules depositions were “limited to obtaining evidence,”
and discovery depositions “never found [their] way into the procedure of the federal courts”) (collecting cases).
50. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 731, at 465.
governed substantially by the practices of the English chancery courts.43
The rarely-used device was allowed where a plaintiff was interested in
certain subject matter, could not bring suit, and testimony of a certain
witness might be lost if not taken promptly.44
d.  Depositions in the Mode Provided by State Law
Finally, an 1892 federal statute provided that, in addition to the above-
listed types of depositions, “it shall be lawful to take the depositions or
testimony of witnesses in the mode prescribed by the laws of the State in
which the courts are held.”45  While this language could have been
interpreted to authorize broader grounds for taking depositions, and even
the taking of party depositions as a matter of right and for discovery
purposes, as was the rule in some states,46 federal courts instead held that
the act did not enlarge the grounds for taking depositions but merely
permitted state procedure to be followed where the grounds for taking
existed under the federal statutes.47  Thus, for example, following state
practice, a commission could be issued by a clerk (rather than the court)
on notice to the opposite party, or a court could issue a dedimus where the
circumstances would authorize a deposition de bene esse under the federal
statutes.48
2.  Unavailability of Depositions for Discovery
Under any of the prescribed types of pre-Rules federal depositions, the
inquiry was strictly limited to preserving proof for trial, and not to be used
as discovery.49  The party taking the deposition could only seek testimony
on allegations in that party’s own pleadings.50  As explained by one pre-
Rules commentator,
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51. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 536, at 750-51 (citations omitted).  See also Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S.
713, 724 (1885) (“It is not according to common usage to call a party in advance of the trial at law, and subject
him to all the skill of opposing counsel to extract something which he may then use or not, as it suits his
purpose.”);  Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 257 (1891) (federal court has no power to subject a
party to discovery examination before trial);  DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 713, at 453-54 (depositions not
intended “to enable a party to ascertain in advance of trial what the testimony of a particular witness will be”)
(collecting cases); id. § 727, at 464.  At the time immediately prior to the passage of the Rules, of course, even
written discovery, in the form of interrogatories and document requests propounded through a bill of discovery
in equity, could only be directed towards information in support of the discoverer’s case and “could not be made
in reference to matters relating solely to the ground of action or defense of the other party.”  Id. § 718, at 456.
52. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 976, at 574.  See also id. § 879, at 528 (for depositions on commission,
“the court will not sanction a merely inquisitorial proceeding,” as that procedure would not meet the central
criterion for a dedimus—that the taking of the deposition was necessary in order to prevent a failure or delay of
justice).
53. 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 566, at 818 (citing Norma Mining Co. v. MacKay, 241 F. 640 (9th
Cir. 1917)).
54. “The deposition may be taken before any judge of any court of the United States, United States
commissioner, or any clerk of a district court, or any chancellor, justice, or judge of a supreme or superior court,
mayor or chief magistrate of a city, judge of a county court or court of common pleas of any of the United
States, or any notary public, not being of counsel or attorney to either of the parties, nor interested in the event
of the cause.” 28 U.S.C. § 639 (1934).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 640 (1934).  The full text reads:
Every person deposing as provided in section 639 of this title [the de bene esse provisions] shall
be cautioned and sworn to testify the whole truth, and carefully examined.  His testimony shall
be reduced to writing or typewriting by the officer taking the deposition, or by some person
under his personal supervision, or by the deponent himself in the officer’s presence, and by no
The pretense of taking a deposition cannot be employed merely to obtain
an examination before trial of a witness whose deposition it is not
intended to use.  Nor can the examination be made infinite and
boundless in its scope, as the statute only authorizes the taking of
“testimony,” or such statements of the witness as are within the realm of
evidence.51
While some incidental discovery might be obtained by deposition, the
pre-1938 federal deposition statutes and rules “were not intended to
produce information, in advance of the trial, but to insure the production
of testimony, at the trial.”52  Where a deposition, as applied for, was limited
to a particular matter, it was within the trial court’s discretion to exclude
testimony in the deposition as to other matters.53
3.  Conduct of Depositions
Pre-Rules statutory provisions set forth few formalities for the
administration of depositions.  For a de bene esse deposition, the statutes
specified only that the deposition be taken before a neutral officer,54 that
the witness be sworn to tell the truth and “carefully examined,” and that
the testimony be reduced to writing and signed by the deponent.55  As
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other person, and shall, after it has been reduced to writing or typewriting, be subscribed by the
deponent.
Id. See also FED. EQ. R. 51 (1912) (Evidence Taken Before Examiners, Etc.).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 644, Rev. Stat. § 866 (specifying that provisions of de bene esse sections of the code do not
apply to depositions taken under the dedimus sections).
57. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 882, at 529.  In the early twentieth century, “common usage” for
dedimus depositions was generally measured from 1874, when the last version of the dedimus statute had been
passed.  But see 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 41, § 26.02, at 2447 (detailing multiple district court interpretations
of the meaning of “according to common usage”).  Courts were to look first to local federal district court rules,
then to other federal districts, then to the laws and usages of the state in which the federal court was located,
with the understanding that new usages might be adopted and become common as needs arose.  DYER-SMITH,
supra note 28, §§ 888, 891, at 531-33.  As an example of shifting “common usage,” it was generally understood
in the late 1800s that a dedimus was taken under a “closed” commission, that is, taken through the use of pre-
written interrogatories, rather than an “open” commission for an oral examination of the deponent.  2
LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 554, at 785.  However, by the time the Rules were enacted in 1938, open
commissions were becoming more common.  DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, §§ 910, 911;  2 LONGSDORF, supra
note 29, § 554, at 785 (open commissions not available under new common usage except for complicated or
unusual issues).  Rules concerning depositions upon interrogatories, except insofar as they overlap with rules
for depositions on open commission, are not particularly relevant to the issues considered in this Article.  This
is especially true for the rules relating to objections.  In the main, objections to written interrogatories were
required to be made at the time the interrogatories were “settled,” that is, at the time the opposing party sought
the commission and before it issued.  EDWARD P. WEEKS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DEPOSITIONS § 395, at
461-62 (1880);  2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 554, at 785 (generally interrogatories were stipulated to by the
parties).  If the commission was issued ex parte and an opposing party was not present for the deposition’s taking,
then the objection was to be presented to the court as soon as it was discovered.  WEEKS, supra, §§ 405, 410, at
473-74, 478.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 644, Rev. Stat. § 866.
59. As with the dedimus rules, the “usages of chancery” also evolved.  For example, while depositions in
chancery were originally taken exclusively by written interrogatory, as was all testimony in equity proceedings,
passage of the new Equity Rules in 1912 reversed the general rules and required live testimony in open court.
This new preference for oral testimony at trial also opened up the availability of pre-trial oral examinations to
perpetuate testimony where the court felt it was just.  DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 955, at 563.  The move of
dedimus from closed to open commissions, and the developed preference of equity for oral examinations,
undoubtedly contributed to the incorporation of a broad oral deposition rule in the 1938 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
detailed below, other important deposition conduct rules were left to
common law.
Even the limited statutory rules for de bene esse depositions were not
applicable directly to dedimus depositions.56  Instead, under the dedimus
statute, depositions on commission were to be taken simply “according to
the common usage.”  This standard applied to both the granting of the
commission and the manner of taking the deposition under it.57
Finally, although authorized for eventual use in a court of law, deposi-
tions taken in equity to perpetuate testimony proceeded by statute
“according to the usages of chancery.”58  The usages of chancery were
determined by reference to English equity practice and, later, to the 1912
Federal Equity Rules.59
With the few and limited statutory directives governing depositions at
law in the pre-Rules system, a common law of rules governing the conduct
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60. See id. §§ 501, 960 (“The general rule has been expressed by the Supreme Court that all objections
of a formal character, and such as might be removed if urged on the examination of the deponent, must be
raised at such examination or upon a motion to suppress the deposition.”) (citing York Mfg. Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 107, 113 (1865)).  See also Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Tripp, 63 F.2d
37 (10th Cir. 1933):
[T]he better rule is that where depositions are taken on oral interrogatories, with both parties
represented, objections that go to the form of the question or the answer must be made while
the deposition is being taken.  A deposition is taken in furtherance of the object of the trial, to
elicit the material facts bearing upon the issues;  if a question or answer is objectionable only in
form, the objection must be interposed while the opportunity exists to correct it;  counsel may
not lie in wait and exclude material evidence by an objection to form made at the trial, when it
is too late to remedy the defect.
Id. at 39-40.  See also WEEKS, supra note 57, § 392, at 458-59;  2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 564, at 812-13.  See
id. § 565, at 815 (“[P]resence and participation waive irregularities attending the taking, at least if not objected
to at the time.”).  See also FED. EQ. R. 51 (1912) (requiring objections to be in short form, stating the grounds,
without argument or debate).
61. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 960, at 565.
62. Id. at § 961; 2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 564, at 813 & n.99.
63. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, §§ 492, 806, at 345-46, 496.
64. Id. § 811, at 498;  2 LONGSDORF, supra note 29, § 543, at 762-63 (footnotes omitted) (“The general
rule is that witnesses should be required to answer all questions that may possibly be material, subject to their
right to be protected in their constitutional privileges.  The witness is not entitled to refuse to answer, because
he or his counsel believe the questions to be immaterial or irrelevant;  but he cannot be forced to make
disclosures which he would not be compelled to make in court.”).
of depositions evolved, which applied without regard to whether a
deposition was taken by notice or commission.  In particular, those rules
dealing with objections were left to the common law:
• Errors in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of
questions and answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct
of the parties, and, more generally, errors of the kind that might be
cured if promptly presented, were waived unless objected to at the
deposition.60
• In contrast, objection as to matters such as admissibility, materiality,
and relevancy were to be made for the first time at trial, when the
deposition was offered to be read into evidence.61
• Formal objections, made at the deposition, needed to point out the
ground for the objection with particularity.62
• The officer administering the deposition could not compel the
deponent to answer a question, nor stop the examination to permit
the filing of a motion to compel.63
• The deponent was required to answer all questions that might possibly
be relevant, subject to the deponent’s right to the protection of
constitutional privileges.64
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65. DYER-SMITH, supra note 28, § 817, at 500-501.
66. Id. §§ 493, 818, at 346, 501.
67. See Note, Legislation:  Civil Deposition Acts, 45 HARV. L. REV. 176, 176 (1931) (footnotes omitted)
(stating that “[l]egislation which provides for the taking of depositions in pending causes may be found in every
state” and collecting statutes, though failing to distinguish discovery and testimony-preserving functions of
depositions);  Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725, 744 (1925-
1926) (“Although there can be no competition among individual lawyers, we have a very effective competition
among systems and rules of practice.  The whole country is a laboratory in which experiments are being actively
conducted.”).  Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting
importance of state government “laboratories of democracy” in a federal system).
68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee notes to subdivisions (a) and (b) (1937) (collecting state
statutes that allow depositions for discovery, deposition discovery of parties and ordinary witnesses, depositions
on notice, and discovery of facts beyond those that support the case of the discovering party).  See also 3
OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 417 (“It has been said that one of the purposes of the rules was to adopt the best
of the modern English and state practices for discovery.”) (citing Canuso v. Niagara Falls, 4 F.R.D. 362
(W.D.N.Y. 1945)).
69. Subrin, supra note 19, at 710 n.126, 713 n.141; id. at 713-17 nn. 142-58 and text accompanying.
70. See generally Sunderland, supra note 17.
• The witness could be excused from answering on the bases of
privilege, that the evidence sought could not possibly be competent,
or that the evidence would be clearly outside of the issues in the
case,65 but advice of or instruction by counsel was not an excuse for
failing to answer an examination question.66
The above list of common-law federal deposition rules will of course
look familiar to those acquainted with the current Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, as many of the common-law guidelines were written into the
1938 Rules and continue to the present.
B.  Pre-1938 State Deposition Rules
The previous section explains the very narrow circumstances under
which depositions could be taken and subsequently used in the federal
courts of the early twentieth century.  In contrast to this narrow federal
procedure, which limited depositions to their original purpose of evidence
preservation, many state courts and legislatures by the late 1800s and early
1900s had experimented with the use of depositions as a discovery
device.67  In doing so, the states set an example that strongly influenced the
drafting of the first comprehensive federal rules of civil procedure.68  In
particular, Professor Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michigan,
drafter of the original discovery rules, which are set out in Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 26-37,69 was on record in the 1930s as believing that
oral deposition discovery would be the key to a new set of federal
discovery rules that would eliminate the “trial by ambush” that character-
ized the pre-Rules federal lawsuit.70
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71. GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932).
72. See id. app. at 272 (“Statutory Provisions on Discovery In the Various Jurisdictions,”collecting pre-
Rules state law discovery and deposition provisions).
73. Id. at 251.
74. Id. (citing lawyers and judges for the opinion that discovery has “a salutary effect upon the whole
tenor of the litigious process,” in part because “[l]itigation is no longer regarded as a game”).
75. Id. at 247-50.
76. Id. at 23, 247-50.
77. Id. at 249 (“Procedural details can be left exactly as they are at present under the various statutes on
depositions.”).
In 1930, George Ragland, a young graduate student researcher at the
University of Michigan’s Legal Research Institute during Sunderland’s
tenure there, set out to document exactly what sorts of discovery devices
had been used by the states, and the relative merits of each device.  The
results of Ragland’s survey were published in 1932 as Discovery Before Trial.71
While Ragland identified a tremendous variety in state-law discovery
devices, particularly as compared to the federal system, he also showed that
no broad, uniform discovery procedure had been adopted in its entirety by
any state.  To the contrary, where a state had opened up one area of
discovery, it generally did so while leaving in place severe limits on other
devices.72
Yet, even though no state had implemented an entire package of
discovery reforms, Ragland concluded that the most desirable system
would be one that incorporated all of the devices available in any of the
states, with each device given the broadest possible construction, in order
to promote “full and equal discovery before trial,”73 viewed by some,
including Ragland, as integral to a comprehensive new civil procedure that
would eliminate perceived gamesmanship and unfairness under the old
rules.74  To that end, Ragland proposed a model set of discovery rules,
providing for interrogatories, requests for admissions, physical inspections,
document requests, and discovery depositions, even though no state had
yet provided this full panoply of procedures to pre-trial practitioners.75
In the case of depositions, Ragland proposed that the restrictions on
taking depositions, as expressed in the federal de bene esse statute and
numerous state provisions, largely be removed, allowing parties to take
depositions on notice to other parties for the purpose of discovering
information that might prove relevant to any party’s case-in-chief or
defensive case.  Restrictions would instead be placed on the subsequent use
of the depositions at trial.76  As for the actual conduct of the deposition,
including the making of objections, Ragland proposed that the rules be the
same as those existing currently for depositions solely used as testimony-
preserving devices.77
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78. Id. at 243 (“A primary requisite to the usefulness of any procedural device is that the lawyers know
the details of the procedure.”).  Id. at 249 (“While there are some defects in the deposition statutes of particular
states, it is of greater moment in the initiation of the new use of the procedure that the lawyers be acquainted
with the procedural details than that these latter be perfect.  Glaring defects which become apparent during the
actual use of the procedure may be remedied later by special statutes.”).
79. Id. at 151-53.
80. Id. at 152;  see also id. at 81 (stating that the chief reason that deposition discovery is thorough is that
“the attorney for the party who is being examined seldom makes objection to the form of the questions”).
81. See id. at iii-iv (Foreword by Edson R. Sunderland).  Ragland’s work also impressed another key
framer of the Rules, Professor Charles E. Clark.  See Charles E. Clark, Book Review, 42 YALE L.J. 988 (1933)
(enthusiastically reviewing Ragland, supra note 71).
82. See Subrin, supra note 19, at 713 (stating that Ragland’s “book was probably the most influential single
source of support for the Federal Rules reformers”).
83. So far as I have been able to ascertain (by comparing his draft with Ragland’s book), his
initial draft included every type of discovery that was known in the United States and probably
England up to that time.  The list is familiar to any American litigator, for almost every type of
discovery he drafted became and remains part of the Federal Rules:  oral and written
depositions;  written interrogatories;  motions to inspect and copy documents and to inspect
tangible and real property;  physical and mental examination of persons;  and requests for
admissions.  Sunderland also included a method for what we now call mandatory disclosure:
a means to force the opponent to “furnish adequately descriptive lists of documents, books,
accounts, letters or other papers, photographs, or tangible things, which are known to him and
are relevant to the pending cause or to any designated part thereof”;  but this did not become
a part of the 1938 Rules.
Subrin, supra note 19, at 718-19 (citation omitted).
84. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully detail the history of the drafting and eventual adoption
in 1938 of the discovery provisions of the Rules.  For a comprehensive background, see Professor Stephen
Subrin’s excellent articles on the subject, especially Fishing Expeditions Allowed:  The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, supra note 19, and How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
Ragland proposed keeping the existing conduct rules for depositions in
large part because lawyers already knew the rules, which would make
adoption easier.  He wanted to avoid any changes where “elaborate details
[would be] provided by statute.”78  Moreover, he did not think the rules for
objections mattered much at all, because he did not believe that lawyers
would make objections for matters other than privilege.79  In fact, he cited
empirical evidence from Canadian experiments with deposition discovery
in which, for example, attorneys objected to only 83 out of 18,437
questions asked during 76 examinations.80
Upon review of Ragland’s work, Professor Sunderland was obviously
taken with the solid evidence therein assembled,81 and Sunderland drew
heavily on Ragland’s ideas and arguments in framing the discovery
provisions of the new Federal Rules.82  The Rules incorporated all of the
discovery devices detailed by Ragland, with a concomitant broadening of
the permitted scope of discovery.83
C.  Depositions Under the 1938 Rules84
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85. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee note (1937);  Rule 26(a) (1938) (modified 1970) (stating that
testimony of any person may be taken “for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for
both purposes”).
86. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1938) (modified 1970).
87. 3 OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 425.
88. In 1946, Rule 26(b) was amended to clarify that objections could not be made on the ground that
testimony discovered in the deposition would be inadmissible at trial, so long as “the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 30, advisory committee’s notes to subdivisions (b) and (d) (1937).  See also Edson R.
Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 22 (1938) (“What the federal rules have done has been to
remove practically all restrictions as to the right of discovery.”).
90. See Downey & Massey, supra note 25, at 184 (citations omitted) (“In 1939, the new procedural
process known simply as ‘discovery’ was heralded as marking ‘the highest point so far reached in the English
speaking world in the elimination of secrecy in the preparation for trial.’  Some foresaw that discovery would
‘stamp the entire federal judicial process with a character of frankness and fairness that [would] go far in aiding
our legal system to overcome the effects of its rather crude heredity.’”);  BREWSTER, supra note 18, § 583, at 335
(1940) (stating that the new federal procedure “proceeds on a theory that each party is entitled to know the
evidentiary basis of the other’s case, and provides the means whereby all factual information may be developed
before trial, thus eliminating the element of surprise at the time of trial”).  See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment.  No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.  Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation.”).
With the adoption of the 1938 Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, the
extreme limits on the taking and use of depositions that had theretofore
existed in the federal system were lifted.  No longer were depositions
available only for preservation of testimony.  Instead, the Rules “freely
authorize[d] the taking of depositions under the same circumstances and
by the same methods, whether for the purpose of discovery or for the
purpose of obtaining evidence.”85  Moreover, depositions could be taken
of both parties and third-party witnesses, upon notice, and no order of
court was necessary unless a deposition was sought within the first twenty
days following commencement of the underlying action.86  While discovery
under the pre-1938 procedure was limited to evidence material to a
petitioning party’s claim or defense, discovery under the Rules, including
that by depositions, was allowed of evidence relating to a claim or defense
of the examining party or any other party.87  Finally, the Rules defined
expansively the permissible scope of depositions, allowing examination
regarding any non-privileged matter “relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action.”88  For the above reasons, the Advisory
Committee notes characterized the new federal deposition rules as giving
an “unlimited right of discovery.”89
Many commentators and courts echoed the advisory committee’s broad
conception of the Rules,90 and lauded the Rules as ushering in a new era
of litigation, where cases would be decided on their merits, based on each
party knowing all the relevant facts, with the element of surprise at trial no
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91. 3 OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 425 (noting court statements that the new discovery rules “were
formulated with the intention of giving the widest latitude in ascertaining before trial facts concerning the real
issue in dispute” and that when properly used the new rules “make surprise at trial impossible”) (collecting
cases);  E. M. Morgan, Book Review, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1350 (1932) (reviewing GEORGE RAGLAND, JR.,
DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932));  Buell McCash, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Discovery and Its Present Status
in the State of Iowa, 20 IOWA. L. REV. 68, 79-80 (1935).  Modern commentators suggest that broad pre-trial
discovery of all relevant evidence is still one of the core principles of the Rules.  See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 25:
The second basic concept in the Federal Rules is that, in general, there should be full mutual
access before trial to evidence that might be relevant to the issues, with a view to presentation
at trial of all evidence relevant to any claim concerning the transaction.  This concept is
implemented by discovery mechanisms permitting a party to obtain from any other party “any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .
. . .”
Id. at 629 (citation omitted).  Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 766 (1998)
(showing that discovery rule revisions since 1938 have narrowed original broad grant).
92. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 41, § 26.02, at 2455:
Under the former procedure, both at law and in equity, the provisions for discovery before trial
had failed to keep step with the liberal modern discovery provisions in many of the states. . . .
But the procedure of examination before trial by the taking of depositions had long been in use
and was well understood.  Yet the conditions imposed upon the taking of depositions prevented
their utilization for discovery purposes.   The chief change made by
the Federal Rules is the removal of these conditions upon the taking and making them applicable
only upon the use of depositions at the trial.
93. See supra Part II.A.3.
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 28 (1938) (modified 1963).  FED. R. CIV. P. 28, Advisory committee’s note (1938)
(“In effect this rule is substantially the same as U.S.C., Title 28, [former] § 639.”).  Rule 28’s more general
designation of officers before whom depositions could be taken did extend the territorial venue for depositions
on notice to “the territories and insular possession subject to [the United States’] sovereignty,” a broader reading
than had been given to the former de bene esse deposition statute, 28 U.S.C. § 639.  3 OHLINGER, supra note 27,
at 447-48 (citing authority).
95. 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 41, § 30.02, at 2569.
96. See supra Part II.A.3.
longer a factor.91  But, although the new Rules completely altered federal
discovery, and in particular provided for the use of depositions as a broad
discovery tool, the specific rules governing the conduct of depositions
were largely lifted from the pre-Rules de bene esse statutes and common law.
Deposition conduct rules therefore changed very little:92
• Under the de bene esse deposition statutes, a deposition could be taken
before any of an enumerated list of neutral officers, ranging from
United States judges to notary publics.93  Rule 28 generalized this
requirement to allow depositions to be taken before “an officer
authorized to administer oaths” by federal or state law.94
• The form of notice required under the new Rule 30(a) was essentially
the same as that for de bene esse depositions.95
• The de bene esse statutes also required that the witness be sworn by the
presiding officer and that the testimony be reduced to writing.96  The
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97. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1938) (modified 1970).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 30, advisory committee notes
to subdivisions (c) and (e) (1937) (citations omitted) (“These follow the general plan of Equity Rule 51 . . . and
[the de bene esse statutes], but are more specific.”).
98. 3 OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 466 (collecting cases).
99. See supra Part II.A.3.
100. Original Rule 32(c) was moved to Rule 32(d)(3) in the 1970 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note (1937) (“This rule is in accordance with common
practice.”);  3 OHLINGER, supra note 27, at 467 (collecting cases to effect that Rule 32(c) reflected pre-Rules
procedure).
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a) (dealing with refusals to answer, but giving no authority to officer to compel
testimony);  2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 41, § 28.01, at 2545 (1938) (stating that “the officer before whom a
deposition is taken has no authority to rule on the admissibility of evidence or to compel answers to questions
or to impose penalties by contempt or otherwise for a refusal to answer a question”).  However, unlike under
new Rule 30 echoed these requirements:  “The officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken shall put the witness on oath and shall
personally, or by some one acting under his direction and in his
presence, record the testimony of the witness.  The testimony shall be
taken stenographically and transcribed unless the parties agree
otherwise.”97
• At common law, an error in stating the place for taking the deposition
was waived by the party’s presence and participation.98  Similarly,
under Rule 32(a), “errors and irregularities in the notice for taking a
deposition” were waived unless promptly objected to in writing.
• At common law, errors in the manner of taking the deposition that
might be cured if promptly raised were waived unless objected to at
the deposition.99  Rule 32(c)100 spelled out this contemporaneous
objection rule, which, according to the Rules Committee was “in
accordance with common practice”:101
(1)  Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency,
relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make
them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of
the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if
presented at that time.
(2)  Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the
manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers,
in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of
any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly
presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto is made at the
taking of the deposition.
Under both common-law rules and the new Rules, the officer adminis-
tering the deposition could not compel the deponent to answer a
question.102
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the common law, the new Rules did allow the questioner to adjourn the examination and file a motion to compel
if a witness refused to answer.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
103. Of course, the definition of “relevant” was much narrower, confined to issues in the questioner’s
case, for example.  See discussion immediately infra.
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938) (modified 1970).
105. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 41, at 2587.
106. This clarified old law, but with an important change in effect.  If an examination is just like trial,
cross-examination would be limited in scope to that of the direct examination.  Under the new Rules, at
deposition one could simply take direct testimony of a witness, even if one did not notice the deposition.  So,
cross-examination might be limited (thus, no leading questions if the witness is not hostile), but one could
directly examine the witness to the full limit of relevancy, without making the witness “one’s own”—i.e., without
limiting later cross-examination of the witness at trial.  This was a big pro-discovery change to the Rules,
removing formalism from old procedure.  See id. at 2483.
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1938) (modified 1970).  This was also a big change—see 2 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 41, § 26.14, at 2479.
108. BREWSTER, supra note 18, § 607, at 346.
Under common law, the deponent was required to answer all questions
that might possibly be relevant,103 subject to the deponent’s right to the
protection of constitutional privileges.  Under new Rule 26, the scope of
the examination was defined as “any matter, not privileged, that is . . .
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”104
A few important diversions from the pre-1938 statutory and common-
law rules of depositions were made in the new Rules.  For example, under
Rule 30(e), a witness could read his deposition and, more importantly,
change the form and substance of his testimony, prior to signing his
deposition.105  In addition, Rule 26(c) explicitly spelled out that examina-
tion and cross-examination during the deposition were to take place as at
trial.106  Finally, while “relevancy” was the standard for the permissible
range of discovery under both the common law and the new Rules, the real
issue is relevant to what?  The new Rules broadened the concept of
relevancy to include any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether
relating to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or
defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowl-
edge of relevant facts.107
Still, the conduct of the deposition itself looked very much the same
under the new Rules as it did in the years immediately preceding.  As one
contemporaneous commentator noted:  “The new procedure introduces
nothing new in the way of ‘procedural conceptions’ insofar as concerns the
actual taking of depositions.”108
Yet the whole theory of depositions had changed.  Pre-Rules, deposi-
tions were authorized in very narrow circumstances, only to preserve
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109. Prior to the 1970 revisions to the Federal Rules, Rule 26, the main discovery provision, which
introduced the new, broader definition of relevance into federal civil practice, was explicitly a deposition rule.
Because the definition of relevance was not given with respect to other discovery devices, such as interrogatories,
requests for admission, and requests for production, early interpretations of those rules relied on a deposition
rule, Rule 26, for determining the scope of all permissible discovery.  The 1970 revisions to the Rules recognized
this by removing the deposition provisions from Rule 26 and dedicating that rule to overall discovery scope.
The 1993 and 2000 revisions to the Rules further modified Rule 26 by including in it the provisions for
mandatory disclosure.
110. The rule providing a new, much broader definition of relevance of course favors fact-gathering, but
probably is better seen as a change in the substantive, rather than conduct, rules of depositions.
111. See, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 & n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that there
“usually is not” a trial in civil cases and citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts study from 1992
showing that only 3.8% of civil cases terminated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania went to trial);  Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”:  Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339,
1342 (1994) (citing evidence that “the portion of cases that terminated in trials dropped from 11 percent in 1961
to 4 percent in 1991”).
testimony, and only to preserve evidence, already known to the examining
party, that supported the party’s case.  Post-Rules, depositions were given
the centerpiece role in the new open discovery procedure, which aimed to
let all parties find out all relevant facts prior to trial.109
But post-1938 rules of deposition conduct changed little to reflect this
new paradigm of broad discovery.  Many rules carried over from pre-rules
law, e.g., rules regarding the form of notice and errors in form, the
qualification of officers before whom depositions could be taken, and the
swearing of the witness and reduction of testimony to writing likely
preference neither fact-gathering nor testimony-preservation.  Nor
probably does the rule allowing a witness to correct his or her testimony
prior to signing—even if new facts are produced or old facts disclaimed,
the original transcript remains for reference, so the effect on facts or
proffered testimony is small.110  But the contemporaneous objection rule
also was adopted, without apparent consideration, with its complete focus
on preservation of testimony.
An interesting question, then, especially given that depositions are now
nearly exclusively used as a discovery device, and almost never used as a
testimony-preserving device,111 is whether the rules of deposition conduct
should reflect this overwhelming trend in deposition usage.  In other
words, are there possible rules of conduct for depositions that would
better promote broad discovery (if considerations relating to testimony
preservation are given less weight or ignored altogether)?  This Article
argues that other rules would be better, and in particular that the contem-
poraneous objection rule should be abandoned in depositions as an
unnecessary impediment to getting at the facts.  An examination of non-
deposition fora that ostensibly are devised primarily for fact-gathering, and
less—if at all—for testimony-preservation, sheds light on this question.
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112. On the usefulness of considering criminal procedure when studying civil procedure, see Judith
Resnick, The Domain Of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2222 (1989) (much can be learned by studying criminal
and civil procedural rules together because, though analogous criminal and civil rules neither are, nor should be,
the same, “the theoretical questions addressed by the two sets of rules are the same and [the] different
resolutions merit analysis”) (citing generally ROBERT COVER ET AL. PROCEDURE (1988)).
113. 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 101, at
196 (2d ed. 1982) (citing In re Grand Jury January, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970));  Andrew D. Leipold,
Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect The Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 262-63 (1995) (citations
omitted) (“[G]rand juries perform only two tasks, neither of which is terribly complex.  First, grand juries are
supposed to serve a ‘screening function’:  they review the prosecutor’s case and decide if the government has
presented enough evidence to justify an indictment.  In forcing the government to present its case to a panel of
citizens at an early stage in the process, and in giving these citizens the ultimate charging power, the institution
III.  DIVINING DISCOVERY DOCTRINE:  
LESSONS FROM OTHER FORA
Given that all legal proceedings are concerned—and usually to a great
extent—with development of the facts giving rise to the dispute at issue,
any number of fact-gathering fora could be examined for comparison to
our current civil deposition.  For this Article, I have chosen what I hope
represents a broad range of possible procedural fact-gathering models,
with particular focus on the range of possible roles for attorneys during
oral discovery.
At one extreme of attorney involvement in discovery is the criminal law
grand jury, in which a witness, outside of the presence of his attorney (if
he has one), is questioned by a partisan advocate with few, if any,
restrictions as to scope of inquiry.  Next on the spectrum, involving more
protection of the witness’s interest by her attorney, particularly in the area
of limiting inquiry into areas of privilege, would lie congressional hearings
and investigations by governmental agencies.  Adding even more
procedural rights for a witness—for example, provisions allowing her
attorney to object to questions as misleading, compound, or otherwise ill-
formed—brings us to the current state of civil discovery.  Somewhere
beyond current civil practice, and at the opposite end of the spectrum
from the criminal grand jury when it comes to partisan questioning, falls
the Continental, civil-law system of fact discovery, in which a neutral judge
is given the sole authority to question witnesses and develop a factual
background for a case.
A.  The Grand Jury112
In theory, the grand jury is supposed to serve as both a “sword” and a
“shield” in criminal pretrial procedure.113  Its sword function is its use as
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has been likened to a ‘shield’ against ill-conceived or malicious prosecutions.  Second, the grand jury acts as an
investigative arm of the government.  It helps the prosecutor gather evidence by calling witnesses and issuing
subpoenas to compel production of documents.  When acting in its investigative capacity, the grand jury has
been called a ‘sword’ in the hands of the prosecution in the fight against crime.”).
114. Leipold, supra note 113, at 267 (citations omitted) (“By traditional trial standards, a grand jury is
allowed to consider a surprising, even shocking, mix of evidence.  The prosecutor is not required to inform the
grand jury of evidence that favors the suspect, even if that evidence is exculpatory.  Jurors are allowed to
consider hearsay, illegally obtained evidence, tips, rumors, or their own knowledge of the alleged crime.  The
Rules of Evidence do not apply, so the prosecutor can ask leading questions and pursue matters that would be
considered irrelevant if presented at trial.”);  Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury:
Converging Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 47 VAND. L. REV. 573, 576 (1994) (citations omitted) (“In
federal criminal cases, these problems with search warrants are somewhat alleviated by the presence of an
alternative procedure—the use of a grand jury subpoena to compel either testimony or the production of
documents.  Grand jury subpoenas need not be supported by probable cause;  they may be used to compel
testimony as well as the production of documents;  and they present a polite and discreet way of obtaining
documents from third parties.  In the federal jurisdiction in particular, the grand jury has become an
indispensable engine of information-gathering and case-building in complex criminal cases.”);  CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 104 (3d ed. 1999) (collecting authority).
115. Michael Vitiello & J. Clark Kelso, Reform of California's Grand Jury System, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513,
516-17 (2002) (citation omitted) (“Popular perception of the grand jury as serving to protect citizens against
oppression originated in the late seventeenth century with the refusal by two rogue grand juries to indict two
prominent Protestant enemies of King Charles II.  Indeed, that perception may account for the widespread
adoption of the grand jury system in the colonies.”);  id. at 518 (giving examples of refusals by colonial American
grand juries to indict).  Cf. Leipold, supra note 113, at 280 (citations omitted) (“While it is clear that the drafters
and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights viewed the grand jury as a source of protection for the accused, it is difficult
to find the factual basis for that belief.  Historical evidence that the grand jury was once an effective screen is
at best inconclusive, and at worst supports the view that the institution never served as much of a shield.”).
116. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 113, at 269 (citation omitted) (“The notion that grand juries do not
eliminate weak cases is now so well accepted that it is difficult to find any recent scholarly support to the
contrary.”);  William L. Osterhoudt, Representing a Grand Jury Witness, LITIG., Winter 1990, at 6 (“Some people
harbor romantic notions of the grand jury as a fair, independent tribunal.  The fact, however, is that the modern
grand jury is firmly under the government’s control.  The prosecutor decides what cases to present, who to call
as witnesses, who should receive immunity, and who should be targeted for prosecution.  The prosecutor draws
up the charge and presents it to the grand jury, which routinely votes to return an indictment.”);  Susan W.
Brenner, The Voice of the Community:  A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 67 (1995)
(“rubber stamp”);  Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 115, at 578 (footnotes omitted) (“The California Supreme Court
has called the grand jury a prosecutor’s  ‘Eden’ because it is ‘the total captive of the prosecutor.’  That is
consistent with the frequent criticism that grand juries serve as a rubber stamp of the prosecutor who presents
evidence to the grand jury.  Statistical evidence suggests that grand juries seldom exercise independent
judgment.”).
117. 38 AM. JUR. Trials § 651 (“In recent years, the focus of the grand jury has shifted from indicting a
potential defendant to providing a data-gathering windfall for the prosecution.”);  Leipold, supra note 113, at 263
(footnotes omitted) (“The fundamental criticism of grand juries can be stated simply.  Many believe that the
a broad-reaching investigatory body—not subject to the probable-cause
limit of the other major tool of criminal investigation, the warrant, and also
not subject to formal evidentiary limits.114  The grand jury, in theory, also
operates as a shield, by requiring a confidential, citizen-led review of a
prosecutor’s evidence prior to issuance of an indictment.115  While a great
deal has been written about the failure of the grand jury to serve as a useful
shield against government overreaching,116 the grand jury has proved an
excellent sword—a far reaching and effective investigative tool.117
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‘shield’ works poorly and the ‘sword’ works only too well.  The grand jury is frequently criticized for failing to
act as a meaningful check on the prosecutor’s charging decisions; according to the clichés it is a ‘rubber stamp,’
perfectly willing to ‘indict a ham sandwich’ if asked to do so by the government.  In contrast, few doubt the
effectiveness of the grand jury’s investigative power.  Here the concern is that prosecutors and grand juries abuse
this authority by harassing unpopular individuals and groups.”);  id. at 314 (“Grand juries are undeniably effective
in helping the government investigate crimes.”).
118. Osterhoudt, supra note 116, at 10 (“Although not in the grand jury room, counsel is almost always
just outside.  Therefore, if the witness is uncertain about the meaning or propriety of a question, she should ask
to be excused to consult with the lawyer.  There is nothing wrong with such a request, and it will almost always
be granted, although the prosecutor may try to discourage the interruption.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
114, § 104 (collecting authority);  38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 101 (“Counsel for Accused or Witness”) (collecting
authority);  Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 115, at 554 (footnotes omitted) (“Current practice in the federal system
demonstrates a strange tension.  A target has a right to consult with counsel, necessary to protect the target’s
privilege to be free from self-incrimination.  However, the target does not have the right to have counsel present
in the grand jury proceedings during questioning of the target.  To assure that the target does not waive his or
her Fifth Amendment right, counsel for a grand jury target who agrees to testify must wait in the hallway outside
the grand jury room.  Periodically, the target leaves the grand jury room to consult with counsel.”);  Cox, 38 AM.
JUR. Trials § 651 (“The attorney should accompany the client to the very door of the hearing room, or as close
as possible, so that the client’s last contact with counsel leaves him with the assurance that his lawyer is right
there, available as needed.”).
119. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 114,  § 104 (collecting examples of different jurisdictional practices);
Kathryn E. White, What Have You Done with My Lawyer?: The Grand Jury Witness’s Right To Consult with Counsel, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV 907, 934-35 (1999) (also collecting examples); 38A C.J.S. Grand Juries § 101 (“Counsel for
Accused or Witness”) (also collecting examples); LaFave, Israel & King, 3 Crim. Proc. § 8.15(c) (also collecting
examples).  See also SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND JURY:  A GUIDE TO LAW
AND PRACTICE § 13.9 (1996).
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e);  United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 (1983).
One of the reasons for the grand jury’s effectiveness for investigation
undoubtedly lies in the fact that, at the federal level at least, a witness is not
allowed representation by counsel in the grand jury room.  Instead, by
custom, witnesses are allowed to leave the presence of the grand jury in
order to consult with an attorney who is physically absent from the grand
jury room, for example, in the hallway or ante-chamber directly outside the
grand jury room.118  The custom varies somewhat across federal jurisdic-
tions in the frequency of allowed witness-counsel conferences.  In some
jurisdictions a witness may be excused from the presence of the grand jury
to consult with counsel after each question, while in other jurisdictions a
witness may leave only after several questions are asked, or even less
frequently.119
Without the presence of witness counsel, a grand jury examination is
less likely to be interrupted, for good or ill, over matters regarding the
form of questions posed.  Of course, neither the grand jury prosecutor nor
witness counsel is concerned over the ultimate admissibility of witness
testimony at trial—the testimony is sealed, and may not be later used at
trial absent significant extenuating circumstances.120  Whether a question
is compound or without foundation only matters insofar as the answer
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121. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 114, at 634 (“The intimidating atmosphere of an inquisition without the
assistance of counsel may be justifiable only by the great public interest in solving and prosecuting crimes.”).
122. 2 LEWIS R. KATZ & PAUL C. GIANNELLI, BALDWIN'S OHIO PRACTICE:  CRIMINAL LAW § 41.8 (“This
rule [that no counsel is allowed] is justified on several rationales.  Grand jury proceedings are investigative and
not prosecutive, and thus the presence of counsel is deemed unnecessary.  Moreover, counsel, if present, might
delay the proceedings and detract from the ex parte nature of the hearing and would also, it is argued, breach
the secrecy of the proceeding.  Finally, witnesses who believe that they have been wronged have the opportunity
to exonerate themselves at trial.”);  38 AM. JUR. Trials § 651 (grand jury is “essentially an accusatory body, not
a judicial tribunal, charged primarily with the duty of investigating infractions of the criminal law within the
jurisdiction”).
123. White, supra note 119, at 919-20 (discussing The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1985 and the Assistance
of Counsel Before Grand Juries Act of 1987, both based on the American Bar Association’s Model Grand Jury
Act);  Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 115, at 562-63 (detailing the features of the ABA proposal, the “first principle”
of which being that counsel for grand jury witnesses should be allowed in the grand jury room).  See also Hughes,
supra note 114, at 669 (arguing that the federal grand jury process should be made more like the procedures used
in agency investigative hearings.  “The processes can be further assimilated by recognizing the right of a witness
(or at least a target) to be accompanied by counsel when appearing before a federal grand jury.  If different
government agencies are charged with substantially identical tasks of criminal investigation, a compelling reason
must be given to explain why our system should tolerate sharply different procedures affecting important
rights.”).
124. Vitiello & Kelso, supra note 115, at 565 (citations omitted) (“Only one of the twenty states that allow
counsel to be present does not limit counsel’s role.  The remaining nineteen states vary in terminology.  For
example, some statutes state simply that counsel ‘shall not participate’ in the proceedings.  Others state ‘counsel
may not communicate with anyone other than his client.’  Still others are more specific in that counsel ‘shall not
make objections, arguments, or address the grand jury.’  The most explicit statute states that counsel shall not
‘[s]peak in such a manner as to be heard by [other] members of the grand jury.’  That is, most of the statutes limit
the role of counsel consistent with the underlying justification for counsel’s presence:  advising the client in order
to protect the client’s rights.”); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.15(b) (2000) (“In one
of the major developments in grand jury reform, roughly twenty states today have statutes permitting at least
solicited by the question does not produce facts understandable to the
grand jury and prosecutor.
Are there any lessons that civil deposition procedure can take from
grand jury practice?  Perhaps.  The federal grand jury model is not one that
could, or likely even should, be grafted onto civil discovery,121 but its
theoretical basis—as an inquisitory tribunal, lacking in the procedural
formality of trial and with a vastly curtailed role for witness
counsel122—more closely matches the actual use of depositions in civil
discovery today than do the procedures on which Rules deposition theory
is grounded.  That theoretical basis recognizes that a strong role for
witness counsel can interfere with discovery of the facts.
Interestingly, there have been proposals for reform of the federal grand
jury proceeding that would make it look like a modified civil deposition
procedure without a contemporaneous objection rule.123  Like the grand
jury procedure currently used in at least twenty states, under the several
model federal proposals that have been advanced, counsel could be
present in the grand jury room.  Importantly, though, and also in
accordance with most of the state-law provisions, counsel would be pro-
hibited from directly addressing the grand jury or making objections.124
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certain witnesses to be assisted by counsel located within the grand jury room.  About half of these provisions
apply to all witnesses, but several are limited to either targets, witnesses who have not been granted immunity,
or witnesses who have waived immunity . . . . The statutes commonly contain provisions limiting the role of
counsel while before the grand jury.  Several state that the lawyer may ‘advise the witness,’ but ‘may not
otherwise take any part in the proceeding.’  One jurisdiction also allows counsel to ‘interpose objections on
behalf of the witness.’  Another provides for such participation upon agreement of the prosecutor and the
foreperson.”).  Because of the possibility of criminal liability, and the need to preserve the Fifth Amendment
claim of privilege against self-incrimination, which is probably more important than any privilege claim
commonly raised in civil-only litigation, counsel would have somewhat more free range to consult with the
witness prior to the witness answering questions.  See White, supra note 119, at 928 (“Witnesses before a grand
jury may not know, and therefore must figure out when and how to claim the privilege against self-incrimination.
This is a daunting task for lay witnesses or anyone who might find the grand jury proceeding somewhat strange,
invasive, or unsettling.  Witnesses may not only be unclear about what is incriminating, they may also be
reluctant to assert the privilege in a room dominated by grand jurors and the prosecution.  As such, the advice
of counsel is critical in preserving and defining the witness’s privilege against self-incrimination.”);  United States
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 603-04 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Not all states, of course, have adopted
procedures allowing for counsel presence in the grand jury room, and opponents of such a procedure present
myriad counter-arguments.  See 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra, § 8.15(b) (opponents “argue that, notwithstanding
statutory prohibitions, counsel accompanying witnesses will find techniques, such as stage whispers and
objections presented through the witness, for challenging the prosecutor’s questions or conveying arguments
to the jurors.  They argue further that, with counsel at the witness’ side, more witnesses will reply to questions
by merely parroting responses formulated by counsel—responses that too often give away as little information
as possible or are purposely ambiguous so as to avoid potential perjury charges.  The critics draw an analogy to
the trial, where the defendant, once taking the stand, is not allowed to interrupt his testimony for further
discussions with counsel.”).
Some would argue that the grand jury actually allows a far more disruptive practice than lawyer
objections, by allowing the witness to leave the grand jury room to consult with an attorney in ante-room,
perhaps as often as every question.  One commentator, himself a criminal defense attorney, considers this to
be better than having a “potted plant” role for the attorney in the grand jury room, because the attorney can do
much more advising in the ante-room, out of view of the grand jury.  Osterhoudt, supra note 116, at 10-11 (“The
role an attorney can play during a grand jury session should be underscored.  Normally there is much emphasis
on how an attorney cannot go into the grand jury room.  That is surely undesirable, but in fact a witness who has
the resolve to leave when necessary can get plenty of advice.  What an attorney can do on the outside is more
than he would be able to do if he were in the grand jury room, but had his status reduced to that of the now-
famous ‘potted plant.’”).  See also 38 AM. JUR. Trials § 651 (“It is important that the witness understand that he
has the right to leave the room at any time to consult with counsel, and may do so after a question has been
asked and before it is answered;  he should be prepared to exercise this right when he has any doubt as to the
legal significance of a question or possible answer.  The witness again must ‘stick to his guns’ and refuse to
answer further questions until given the right to confer with counsel.  This may involve a trip to the judge or
magistrate if the prosecutor feels the privilege is being abused, but the goal will be achieved—counsel will again
be in personal touch with his client.”).
125. Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Opposition and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. 7 (1987)
(testimony of Oliver L. North).  The House committee was chaired by Rep. Lee H. Hamilton.
B.  Congressional Hearings:  Counsel as “Potted-Plant”
During the 1987 hearings before the House and Senate select
committees on the Iran-Contra scandal,125 Senate committee chairman Sen.
Daniel K. Inouye admonished Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr., counsel for witness
Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North, for repeatedly interrupting questioning with
objections and told him to “Let the witness object if he wishes to.”
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126. The full colloquy was as follows:
Mr. Sullivan:  Objection.  It’s a hypothetical question.  Pure speculation.
Mr. [Arthur] Liman [, committee counsel]:  You say that you were not sure whether the Attorney
General was conducting this inquiry at the request of the President or at the request of the
admiral.  That’s what I heard you say.
Mr. North:  No.  What I said was, I don’t know that the admiral told me on the 21st that the
President, at least I don’t recall knowing at the time that the admiral told me that this was being
done at the request of the President.  He may well have told me that.
Mr. Liman:  Would you have shredded less documents on the 22[n]d if you had been told that
the Attorney General was acting at the specific request of the President, your Commander in
Chief?
Mr. Sullivan:  Objection.
Chairman Inouye:  What is the basis of your objection?
Mr. Sullivan:  It is pure speculation.  Dreamland.  It has two “ifs” in it, and Mr. Liman knows
better than most, that those kinds of questions, Mr. Chairman, are wholly inappropriate not just
because of rules of evidence, not because you couldn’t say it in a court, but because it’s just
dreamland.  It is speculation.  He says if you had done this and if you had done that, what about
this?  Come on, let’s have, Mr. Chairman, plain fairness.  Plain fairness, that’s all we are asking
for.
Chairman Inouye:  May I speak?
Mr. Sullivan:  Yes, sir.
Chairman Inouye:  I’m certain counsel realizes this is not a court of law.
Mr. Sullivan:  Believe me, I know that.
Chairman Inouye:  I’m certain you realize the rules of evidence do not apply in this inquiry.
Mr. Sullivan:  That I know as well.  I’m just asking for fairness.  Fairness.  I know the rules don’t
apply.  I know the Congress doesn’t recognize attorney-client privilege, a husband-and-wife
privilege, priest-penitent privilege.  I know these things are all out the window.  We rely on just
fairness, Mr. Chairman, fairness.
Chairman Inouye:  We have attempted to be as fair as we can.  Let the witness object if he
wishes to.
Mr. Sullivan:  I’m not a potted plant.  I’m here as a lawyer.  That’s my job.
Id.  See also Note of Braggadocio Resounds at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1987, at A7.
127. Much has been written about the rights of witnesses in congressional hearings, all well beyond the
scope of what I am considering here, which is the ideal procedural rules for witness counsel in hearings.  We can
assume that the witness has basic rights without answering the question of what his counsel is allowed to do in
defending the witness.
Sullivan famously replied, “Well, sir, I’m not a potted plant.  I’m here as
the lawyer.  That’s my job.”126  While Sullivan’s clever riposte garnered
much publicity, and while his aggressive tactics surely served to deflect
some congressional attention from his client, it is not at all clear that he
correctly evaluated the proper role for counsel in congressional hearings.
Assuming some basic constitutional right to counsel in congressional
hearings—for example, a right to be advised as to a witness’s exercise of
the privilege against self-incrimination127—the more pertinent question for
this inquiry is what rights beyond this basic representation are given to
witnesses by the procedural rules of the House or Senate, or committees
of those bodies.
The short answer is:  not many.  House rules provide only a baseline,
stating that “[w]itnesses at [investigative] hearings may be accompanied by
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128. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 108th Congress (Jan. 7, 2003), Rule XI.2(k)(3), available
at http://www.houses.gov/rules/house_rules.htm.  See also id. at Rule XI.2(k)(4) (“The chairman may punish
breaches of order and decorum, and of professional ethics on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from
the hearings;  and the committee may cite the offender to the House for contempt.”).  The draft model
committee rules for House committees in the 108th Congress make no mention of counsel for witnesses.  See
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules, Draft Model Committee Rules,
http://www.house.gov/rules/comm_rules_draft.htm (last visited July 28, 2003).  Historically, according to
Jefferson’s Manual:
Where witnesses and others have been arraigned at the bar of the House for contempt, the
House has usually permitted counsel, sometimes under conditions; but in a few cases has
declined the request.  In investigations before committees counsel usually have been admitted,
sometimes even to assist a witness, and clause 2(k)(3) of rule XI now provides that witnesses at
hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning
their constitutional rights.
See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 107-284, at 168-69 (2003), GPO Access, available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/hrm/browse_108.html (citing ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES (1907), GPO Access, available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/precedents/hinds/index.html) (citations omitted).  See 3 HINDS, supra, § 1772
(footnote omitted) (“Instance wherein a witness summoned before an investigating committee was accompanied
by counsel.—On June 4, 1878, James E. Anderson, a witness before the select committee appointed to
investigate the Presidential election of 1876, was accompanied by counsel, who sat behind him and consulted
with him during the examination.”).  See also WM. HOLMES BROWN, HOUSE PRACTICE:  A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE § 25, at 261 (GPO 1996) § 25 at 261 (“Although the applicable
rule permits witnesses to have counsel at investigative hearings, it is the witness, not counsel, who has ultimate
responsibility for protecting his rights and invoking the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the rules of the
House.  The attorney for the witness may not, as a matter of right, present argument or make demands on the
committee.  See [Congressional Record] 89–2, Oct. 18, 1966, pp 27486–95.”);  LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S
PRECEDENTS ch. 15 § 14, H.R. DOC. NO. 94-661 at 2385-89 (Thomas Nicola ed., 1986), GPO Access, available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/precedents/ deschler/browse.html.
129. Committees adopting the House Rule or its language are Agriculture, Government Reform, House
Administration, Science, and Transportation and Infrastructure.  The Committee on Resources has no provision
with respect to witness counsel (though it incorporates House Rule XI “to the extent applicable”), but does have
a specific provision for witness claims of privilege:  “Claims of common-law privileges made by witnesses in
hearings, or by interviewees or deponents in investigations or inquiries, are applicable only at the discretion of
the Chairman, subject to appeal to the Committee.”  RULES FOR THE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES, 108th
Congress, Rule 4(i) (2003), available at http://www.house.gov/ resources/108cong/rules.htm#rule6. 
their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their
constitutional rights.”128  Only seven of the nineteen standing committees
of the House in the 108th Congress have rules relating to counsel for
witnesses.  These committees generally provide the same right to counsel
as does the House rule, either by incorporating the rule by reference or
using its language.129  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the one House committee
that gives greater rights than the basic House rule is the Committee on
Standards of Official Conduct, which oversees the conduct of
congressmen, officers, and employees of the House.  The rules of that
Committee require that a witness be informed of the right to counsel, give
the witness time to obtain counsel, provide that a represented witness is
not to be questioned in the absence of counsel, and give the witness’s
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130. Applicable Rules for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/house16.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2004), are as follows:
Rule 20 (Investigative Subcommittee):
(a)(2) The Chairman of the investigative subcommittee shall ask respondent and all
witnesses whether they intend to be represented by counsel.  If so, respondent or witnesses or
their legal representatives shall provide written designation of counsel.  A respondent or witness
who is represented by counsel shall not be questioned in the absence of counsel unless an
explicit waiver is obtained.
. . .
(b) During the inquiry, the procedure respecting the admissibility of evidence and rulings
shall be as follows:
(b)(1) Any relevant evidence shall be admissible unless the evidence is privileged under the
precedents of the House of Representatives.
(b)(2) The Chairman of the subcommittee or other presiding member at any investigative
subcommittee proceeding shall rule upon any question of admissibility or pertinency of evidence,
motion, procedure or any other matter, and may direct any witness to answer any question under
penalty of contempt.  A witness, witness’s counsel, or a member of the subcommittee may
appeal any evidentiary rulings to the members present at that proceeding.  The majority vote of
the members present at such proceeding on such appeal shall govern the question of
admissibility, and no appeal shall lie to the Committee.
Rule 24 (Adjudicatory Hearings):
(i) During the hearing, the procedures regarding the admissibility of evidence and rulings
shall be as follows:
(b) (1)  Any relevant evidence shall be admissible unless the evidence is privileged under
the precedents of the House of Representatives.
(b) (2) The Chairman of the subcommittee or other presiding member at an adjudicatory
subcommittee hearing shall rule upon any question of admissibility or pertinency of evidence,
motion, procedure, or any other matter, and may direct any witness to answer any question
under penalty of contempt.  A witness, witness’s counsel, or a member of the subcommittee may
appeal any evidentiary ruling to the members present at that proceeding.  The majority vote of
the members present at such proceeding on such an appeal shall govern the question of
admissibility and no appeal shall lie to the Committee.
. . .
(j)(4) Witnesses at a hearing shall be examined first by counsel calling such witness.  The
opposing counsel may then cross-examine the witness.  Redirect examination and recross
examination may be permitted at the Chairman’s discretion.  Subcommittee members may then
question witnesses.  Unless otherwise directed by the Chairman, such questions shall be
conducted under the five-minute rule.
(k) A subpoena to a witness to appear at a hearing shall be served sufficiently in advance
of that witness’ scheduled appearance to allow the witness a reasonable period of time, as
determined by the Chairman of the adjudicatory subcommittee, to prepare for the hearing and
to employ counsel.
Rule 27 (Rights of Respondents and Witnesses):
(a) A respondent shall be informed of the right to be represented by counsel, to be
provided at his or her own expense.
. . .
(k) Witnesses shall be afforded a reasonable period of time, as determined by the
Committee or subcommittee, to prepare for an adjudicatory hearing or for an appearance before
an investigative subcommittee, and to obtain counsel.
(n) Witnesses may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them
concerning their constitutional rights.  The Chairman may punish breaches of order and
counsel the right of examination and cross-examination of witnesses who
appear before the Committee.130
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decorum, and of professional responsibility on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion
from the hearings;  and the Committee may cite the offender to the House of Representatives
for contempt.
131. AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES, 2001–2002, S. DOC. NO. 107-3 (2001).
132. See id.  The rules were:  Special Committee on Aging, Rule 5(4)(a), id. at 6 (“A witness’s counsel shall
be permitted to be present during his testimony at any public or closed hearing or depositions or staff interview
to advise such witness of his rights . . . .”), and Rule (5)8, id. at 7 (“If, during public or executive sessions, a
witness, his counsel, or any spectator conducts himself in such a manner as to prevent, impede, disrupt, obstruct,
or interfere with the orderly administration of such hearing the Chairman or presiding Member of the
Committee present during such hearing may request the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, his representative or
any law enforcement official to eject said person from the hearing room.”);  Committee on Armed Services, Rule
10(g), id. at 26 (“Any witness summoned to give testimony or evidence at a public or closed hearing of the
Committee or subcommittee may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing who shall be permitted at
all times during such hearing to advise such witness of his legal rights.”);  Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, Rule 4(e), id. at 33 (“Any witness subpoenaed by the Committee or Subcommittee to a public or
executive hearing may be accompanied by counsel of his or her own choosing who shall be permitted, while the
witness is testifying, to advise him or her of his or her legal rights.”);  Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources Investigations, Rule 10(b), id. at 51 (“A witness called to testify in an investigation shall be . . .
permitted to have counsel of his or her choosing present during his or her testimony at any public or closed
hearing, or at any unsworn interview, to advise the witness of his or her legal rights.”);  Select Committee on
Ethics, Rule 5(j)(4), id. at 77 (“Any witness at an adjudicatory hearing may be accompanied by counsel of his or
her own choosing, who shall be permitted to advise the witness of his or her legal rights during the testimony.”);
Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rule 5(D), id. at 119 (“Counsel retained by any witness and accompanying
such witness shall be permitted to be present during the testimony of such witness at any public or executive
hearing or deposition to advise such witness while he or she is testifying of his or her legal rights . . . . This
subsection shall not be construed to excuse a witness from testifying in the event his counsel is ejected for
conducting himself in such manner so as to prevent, impede, disrupt, obstruct or interfere with the orderly
administration of the hearings;  nor shall this subsection be construed as authorizing counsel to coach the
witness or answer for the witness.”);  Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Rule 17(d), id. at
135 (“Any witness summoned to testify at a hearing, or any witness giving sworn testimony, may be
accompanied by counsel of his own choosing who shall be permitted, while the witness is testifying, to advise
him of his legal rights.”);  Select Committee on Intelligence, Rule 8.4, id. at 154 (“(a) Any witness may be
accompanied by counsel . . . . (b) Counsel shall conduct themselves in an ethical and professional manner.
Failure to do so shall, upon a finding to that effect by a majority of the members present, subject such counsel
to disciplinary action which may include warning, censure, removal, or a recommendation of contempt
proceedings.  (c) There shall be no direct or cross-examination by counsel.  However, counsel may submit in
writing any question he wishes propounded to his client or to any other witness and may, at the conclusion of
his client’s testimony, suggest the presentation of other evidence or the calling of other witnesses.  The
The overall lesson of the House rules?  Except for when members
themselves might be the subject of inquiry, the House recognizes that
investigation will be more effective where witness counsel is given fewer
opportunities to disrupt the proceedings.  Of course, testimony given
before a House committee will not normally be admissible at trial, so the
rules do not have to take that contingency into account.
The general Senate rule on committee procedure, Rule XXVI, does not
touch upon the issue of representation of witnesses at hearings, but only
directs each committee of the Senate to adopt rules of procedure for
hearings that are not inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate.131  Only
nine of the twenty Senate standing, select, and special committees of the
107th Congress had rules dealing with witness counsel.132  The basic rule
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Committee may use such questions and dispose of such suggestions as it deems appropriate.”), and Rule 8.6,
id. (“Any objection raised by a witness or counsel shall be ruled upon by the Chairman or other presiding
member, and such ruling shall be the ruling of the Committee unless a majority of the Committee present
overrules the ruling of the chair.”);  Committee on Small Business, Rule 3(d), id. at 171 (“Any witness summoned
to a public or closed hearing may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing, who shall be permitted while
the witness is testifying to advise him of his legal rights.”).
133. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Rule 5(D), id. at 119.
134. My focus here is on agency fact-finding investigations, rather than agency adjudications, which are
more trial-like in nature, or agency depositions, which are more limited.  See CHARLES H. KOCK, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.40 (2d ed. 1997) (citations omitted) (“The great majority of agencies
have rules providing for deposition.  These rules, however, almost always provide for deposition to preserve
testimony only and they rarely provide for discovery deposition.  While depositions prove to be useful, if also
expensive and slow, discovery tools in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, experience in agency proceedings
have not been so positive.”).
135. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 332-33, (1957) (citation omitted) (“The fact that appellants were
under a legal duty to speak and that their testimony might provide a basis for criminal charges against them does
not mean that they had a constitutional right to the assistance of their counsel.  Appellants here are witnesses
regarding counsel is that counsel may be present during testimony “to
advise the witness of his or her legal rights.”  The Committee on
Governmental Affairs, while granting the right of counsel to be present to
advise the witness of legal rights, specifically notes:
This subsection shall not be construed to excuse a witness from
testifying in the event his counsel is ejected for conducting himself in
such manner so as to prevent, impede, disrupt, obstruct or interfere with
the orderly administration of the hearings;  nor shall this subsection be
construed as authorizing counsel to coach the witness or answer for the
witness.133
For congressional hearings, then, witness counsel is not permitted the
intrusive behavior that marks civil deposition procedure.  Many reasons for
the differences in procedure can be advanced—strong governmental
interest in congressional hearings, ability of Congress to grant immunity
to witnesses, inconvenience to members of Congress in allowing intrusive
objections—but a fundamental argument is that, when one is constructing
rules for investigation, rather than preservation of testimony, the role of
witness counsel is greatly diminished.
C.  Agency Investigations134
The rules of conduct for witnesses’ attorneys in administrative agency
proceedings vary among the agencies, and even within a given agency
based on the type of proceeding and the status of the witness as a potential
target.  For our purposes, the following rough outline will suffice:  the
Constitution does not require assistance of counsel for a witness in an
administrative proceeding,135 except where a hearing is required by due
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from whom information was sought as to the cause of the fire.  A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as
a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a witness before other investigatory
bodies.”).  Even the dissenting Justices in Groban, who would have found a constitutional right to some counsel
in administrative investigations, recognized that the right might be highly circumscribed and still meet
constitutional muster.  See id. at 349 n.28 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps, if a real need could be shown, counsel
could be restricted to advising his client and prohibited from making statements or asking questions.  And there
are other alternatives, much less drastic and prejudicial to the witness than the complete exclusion of his counsel,
which might provide satisfactory protection for the witness without unduly impairing the efficiency of the
examination.”);  see also Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) (approving state investigatory
procedure against due process challenge where witness counsel was not allowed in the hearing room while
witness was being questioned, but witness was free to consult with counsel outside of the examination room at
any time during the interrogation);  Kanterman v. Attorney General, 350 N.Y.S.2d 516, 519-20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1973) (holding that, in securities fraud investigation of witness under subpoena, state attorney general could limit
the participation of the witness’s attorney to advising the witness of his constitutional rights).
136. Ernest H. Schopler, Comment Note—Right To Assistance By Counsel In Administrative Proceedings, 33
A.L.R.3d 229 (1970) (citations omitted) (“Whether due process requires representation by counsel in
administrative proceedings depends upon a variety of factors.  As a general proposition, which, however, is
subject to limitations, the right to employ counsel exists where due process requires a hearing.  A hearing is
ordinarily required by due process in proceedings in which an administrative agency exercises its adjudicatory
or determinative, as distinguished from its investigatory, powers.”).   See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442
(1960) (“‘Due process’ is an elusive concept.  Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies
according to specific factual contexts.  Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding
determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the
procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process.  On the other hand, when
governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as for example, when a general fact-finding
investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.”).
137. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that “[a] person compelled to appear in person before
an agency . . . is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency,
by other qualified representative.”  5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1988).
138. Schopler, supra note 136, at 229 (“Questions as to the right to representation by counsel in
investigatory administrative proceedings may arise not only as a matter of constitutional law, but also as a matter
of statutory construction.  In the absence of a statute or administrative regulation specifically otherwise
providing, the courts are reluctant to construe statutes authorizing representation by counsel in a specific
administrative proceeding as extending to the investigatory stage of the administrative process.”).
139. Id. (“As emphasized in Backer v. Commissioner (1960, CA5 Ga) 275 F2d 141, a person’s right to
counsel guaranteed under the Administrative Procedure Act is much broader than the right to have an attorney
to advise him relative to his rights under the Fifth Amendment;  the Act says, without any limitation, that such
counsel may accompany, represent, and advise one compelled to appear before an administrative agency.”).  Cf.
Groban, 352 U.S. at 334 (“The presence of advisors to witnesses might easily so far encumber an investigatory
proceeding as to make it unworkable or unwieldy.”).
process—generally adjudicative, not investigatory, proceedings.136  Instead,
any right to counsel in an investigation must arise out of statute or agency
rule.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) affords parties appearing
before agencies the right to be “accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel,” 137 but this right only applies to adjudicative proceedings, and
only where witnesses have been compelled to appear.138  In investigatory
proceedings, or in voluntary appearances at adjudicative proceedings, the
agency under the APA may restrict or eliminate the role of witness
attorney in order to make the investigation more efficient.139
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140. See 2 KOCK, supra note 134, § 6.23(5), at 353-54.
141. 12 C.F.R. § 308.148 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rules of procedure for investigations:
“Rights of Witnesses”).  See also 12 C.F.R. § 622.105 (Farm Credit Administration rules of procedure for formal
investigations:  “Conduct of investigation”) (to same effect);  17 C.F.R. § 11.7 (Commodity Futures Trading
Commission rules for investigations:  “Rights of witnesses”) (same);  17 C.F.R. § 203.7 (Securities and Exchange
Commission rules for formal investigative proceedings:  “Rights of witnesses”) (same);  42 C.F.R. § 1006.4
(Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General for Health Care “procedures for
investigational inquiries”) (witness entitled to be “accompanied, represented and advised by an attorney;”
witness has “opportunity to clarify his or her answers on the record.”).
142. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 1.27 (Federal Communications Commission rules of practice and procedure for
all Commission proceedings:  “Witnesses;  right to counsel”) (for any “individual compelled to appear in
person:”  right to counsel;  right to advice before, during, and after the proceeding;  right for counsel to object
and state basis therefore;  in judgment of presiding officer, permission for counsel to ask clarifying questions
of witness);  49 C.F.R. § 510.5 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rules for “information gathering
hearings”) (for any “person who is required by subpoena . . . to provide information at an information gathering
hearing;”  right to confer in confidence with counsel concerning any questions asked;  right to object and state
basis);  see also 14 C.F.R. § 305.9 (Department of Transportation procedural regulations for informal nonpublic
investigations in aviation proceedings:  “Rights of witnesses”) (“Any person compelled to testify . . . may be
accompanied, represented, and advised by counsel.”).
Most agencies, however, give more rights to witnesses than either the
Constitution or the APA require.140  Typical of agency regulations is
language that allows “[a]ny person compelled or requested to provide
testimony as a witness” to be represented in agency investigatory
proceedings by counsel, who may:  “(1) Advise the witness before, during,
and after such testimony;  (2) Briefly question the witness at the conclusion
of such testimony for clarification purposes;  and (3) Make summary notes
during such testimony solely for the use and benefit of the witness.”141
Other agencies provide a similar right to counsel in investigatory
proceedings, but only for witnesses appearing under compulsion of
process.142  For these agencies, then, procedure is not so different than our
present civil practice.
However, one group of agencies, including the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board, provides far more detailed regulations
governing a witness’s right to counsel in investigatory proceedings.  In
particular, the regulations of these agencies constrain counsel’s ability to
disrupt investigations by limiting counsel’s opportunity and mode of
making objections.
For example, under FTC regulations, objections are limited to claims
that evidence sought from a witness is “outside the scope of the
investigation” or that the witness need not answer a question on grounds
of privilege.  Either of these types of objections may be made on the
record, and the witness’s attorney “may state briefly and precisely the
ground therefor,” but the “witness and his counsel . . . shall not otherwise
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143. 16 C.F.R. § 2.9 (“Rights of witnesses in investigations”);  id. at § 2.9(b)(1), (b)(2).  Similar regulations
can be found for other agencies at 16 C.F.R. § 1605.8 (Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations under
the Flammable Fabrics Act);  40 C.F.R. § 1610.1 (Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board rules for
administrative hearings);  24 C.F.R. § 3800.50 (Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations for
investigations in consumer regulatory programs).
144. 16 C.F.R. § 2.9(b)(4).
145. Id. § 2.9(b)(3).
146. Id. § 2.9(b)(6). 
147. An exception to inadmissibility at trial would be for a party to a civil case, whose prior agency
testimony could come in as a statement of a party opponent.  Another exception would be for admissions
against interest.
148. Of course, if a witness is determined to be evasive, or to perjure himself to hide information, no set
of procedural rules will be effective at getting the information.
interrupt the oral examination.”143  This prohibition against interruption by
counsel is repeated in the FTC regulations:  “Counsel for a witness may
not, for any purpose or to any extent not allowed by [the above-cited
sections], interrupt the examination of the witness by making any
objections or statements on the record.”144
Moreover, objections are treated as continuing and preserved through-
out the hearing without the necessity for repeating them.  “Cumulative
objections are unnecessary,” and “[r]epetition of the grounds for any
objection” is not allowed.145  Finally, the person conducting the hearing is
directed to “take all necessary action to regulate the course of the hearing
to avoid delay and to prevent or restrain disorderly, dilatory, obstructionist,
or contumacious conduct, or contemptuous language,” with possible
penalties for disorderly conduct including exclusion from additional
participation in the particular investigation, or even suspension or
disbarment from any further FTC practice.146
In sum, attorneys representing a witness in these agency proceedings are
given almost no tools for impeding the examiner through obstructive
tactics.  The scope of objections is vastly confined, to not much more than
protection of privilege;  objections must be briefly phrased, and may not
be repeated;  all other interruptions by counsel are prohibited;  and dilatory
conduct is expressly punishable.
Of course, as with transcripts of congressional hearings, transcripts
from a proceeding conducted under these agency rules generally would not
be admissible at trial, without regard to the availability of the witness.147
But the Rules are not set up with such an eventuality in mind —they are
expressly devised to increase the effectiveness of an investigation.  In these
agency investigatory proceedings, witnesses are protected if a privilege is
threatened, but non-privileged information is hard to hide.148  While the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they relate to depositions have been
amended in the last decade to limit lengthy objections, and to more
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149. See supra Part IV.B.
150. John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
151. Professor Langbein takes care to point out that the German civil system, as a whole, is adversarial,
with lawyers there playing “major and broadly comparable” roles to their American counterparts in most of the
litigation process.  The important distinction for Professor Langbein, and for us, is in the non-adversarial nature
of fact-finding.  Id. at 824 n.4 (“When writers take the shortcut and speak of German or other Continental civil
procedure as ‘nonadversarial’ (a usage that I think should be avoided although I confess to having been guilty
of it in the past), the description is correct only insofar as it refers to that distinctive trait of Continental civil
procedure, judicial conduct of fact-gathering.”).  See also id. at 841-42 (“Outside the realm of fact-gathering,
German civil procedure is about as adversarial as our own.  Both systems welcome the lawyerly contribution to
identifying legal issues and sharpening legal analysis.  German civil procedure is materially less adversarial than
our own only in the fact-gathering function, where partisanship has such potential to pollute the sources of
truth.”).
152. See Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure:  A Plea for More Details and Fewer
Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705 (1988).
153. John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 75 IOWA L. REV.
987 (1990);  see also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 60 (1997) (“[T]he civil law
example is one to be followed only with the greatest caution.”) (citing differences in civil and common law
systems).
154. Langbein, supra note 150, at 824.
155. Id. at 862 (“For example, we might have the judge (or a surrogate such as a master or a magistrate)
depose witnesses and assemble the rest of the proofs, working in response to adversary nomination and under
adversary oversight as in German procedure.  We might then be able to forbid the adversaries from contact with
expressly prohibit obstructionist conduct by witness counsel,149 the fact
that the Rules spring from a background of testimony preservation means
that they are not as good for discovery as they might otherwise be.
D.  Neutral Inquisitors:  A German Advantage?
Professor John Langbein’s seminal article, The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure,150 laid the foundation for comparing the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s adversarial discovery processes and Continental civil
procedure, which features judicial conduct of fact-gathering.151  While the
article has been criticized descriptively, for its failure to accurately present
German procedures,152 and normatively, for not exploring the many
complexities of adopting the system in the United States,153 it remains the
most accepted account of the advantages that civil-law fact-finding might
bring to our own civil discovery system.
Langbein’s main argument is that U.S. discovery process, because it is
lawyer-driven and adversarial, is needlessly expensive and complex, and
presents great opportunities for lawyers to distort the evidence upon which
a case is ultimately decided.  In contrast, the German system, where judges,
not lawyers, are assigned the task of factual investigation, avoids many of
our problems, Langbein argues.154  Among the specific problems Langbein
identifies in the American system is lawyer over-preparation and coaching
of witnesses.155  While Langbein largely focuses on the distorting effects of
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witnesses—in other words, we could abolish the coaching that disgraces our civil justice.”).
156. See also William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT.
L. REV. 703, 717 (1989) (citations omitted) (“But for the pretrial stages of litigation, the practice under the
continental system bears sympathetic examination, if not emulation.  That practice involves the staged
development of the case under the direction of the judge, with a gradual narrowing of issues as the facts are
marshalled.  The process is deliberate and controlled, not competitive or confrontational.”).
157. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century:  Toward a NewWorld
Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 153 nn.188, 201 (1999) and accompanying text;  Reitz, supra note 153,
at 988 (“My interest lies with Langbein’s claim that we could adopt the central aspect of German civil procedure,
judicially dominated fact-finding, without changing many other fundamental characteristics of our modern civil
procedure.  I believe we could not.”);  see also id. at 992 (“After considering the ways in which German-style
judicial control over witness examination might be introduced into the American system—including, but not
limited to, Alschuler’s proposal for a two-tier trial system—I come to the conclusion that judicially led fact
production is incompatible with a number of fundamental features of our contemporary legal system.”).
158. For another interesting proposal, see Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger:  The Shortage of
Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1836-57 (1986).
159. Langoein, supra note 150, at 866.  See also Janeen Kerper & Gary L. Stuart, Rambo Bites the Dust:  Current
Trends in Deposition Ethics, 22 J. LEGAL PROF. 103, 122 (1997/98) (terming non-adversarial discovery an aspect
of a growing “court first, client second doctrine” in American law) (citing W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering
Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 895 (1996) (“Lawyers have an obligation to be advocates for their clients,
but . . . this duty does not apply with full force to discovery.  The function of discovery within the litigation
system requires that lawyers assist the court in adjudicating the dispute on the merits by disclosing the facts
necessary for the court to make an informed decision.  With limited exceptions, advocacy comes into play only
after the facts are fully disclosed . . . . Courts are beginning to recognize that the discovery system is designed
witness coaching on subsequent trial testimony, the argument has perhaps
even greater strength when applied to witness coaching and obstruction in
the deposition setting, where no fact-finder is present to temper the
lawyers’ adversarial behavior.
Langbein’s ultimate conclusion is that an extension of the United States’
already growing use of managerial judging, to encompass the fact-finding
function, might be a way to bring the American system closer to the
German one.156  It is this final conclusion, that judges might be charged
with fact-finding duties, not the underlying analysis of American problems
and German advantages, which has drawn the most criticism of Langbein’s
paper.157  Because Germany has an entrenched and specifically educated
judiciary, and because America has a long-established system of adversary
civil litigation, the systems may not ever be compatible on this point.158
But we need not accept Langbein’s conclusions, nor need we fully delve
into the intricacies of German law, or any other system, to draw out the
important point here:  that some successful models of fact-finding are not
predicated on any sort of adversarial model.  Langbein makes the point
most clearly:
A]dversary theory was misapplied to fact-gathering in the first place.
Nothing but inertia and vested interests justify the waste and distortion
of adversary fact-gathering.  The success of German civil procedure
stands as an enduring reproach to those who say that we must continue
to suffer adversary tricksters in the proof of fact.159
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to facilitate truth-finding, and they are involving lawyers in this search for the truth.  They are imposing public
duties upon lawyers in discovery that are not merely rhetorical fluff, but have content and carry severe sanctions
for their violation.”)).
160. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 53-54 (Del. 1994) (court
noted “extraordinarily rude, uncivil, and vulgar” behavior by deponent’s counsel, including repeatedly telling
examining attorney to “shut up” and to stop “asking stupid questions”);  Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D.
525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citation omitted) (“Depositions are the factual battleground where the vast majority
of litigation actually takes place.  It may safely be said that Rule 30 has spawned a veritable cottage industry.  The
significance of depositions has grown geometrically over the years to the point where their pervasiveness now
dwarfs both the time spent and the facts learned at the actual trial— assuming there is a trial, which there usually
is not.  The pretrial tail now wags the trial dog.”);  Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 594,
597 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (suspending attorney for threatening opposing counsel with the statement, “You can write
While one solution, à la Langbein, might be to remove the adversaries
from the fact-gathering process, another might be to remove the
opportunities and incentives for “adversarialness” from the process.
IV.  POST-1938 REVISIONS TO THE DEPOSITION RULES
So far, this Article has shown that, while with the passage of the Rules
in 1938 depositions changed radically from being a somewhat rare
testimony-preservation device into an important discovery tool, the
standards of deposition conduct changed very little.  Moreover, it has
illustrated that many other legal fora which focus on fact discovery rather
than testimony preservation have adopted more constricted rules for
lawyer conduct in those proceedings.  This Part will examine post-1938
amendments to the Federal Rules, and other more localized responses to
the Rules such as court standing orders and rulings, for evidence of
changes that reflect an attempt to better balance the fact-gathering and
testimony-preserving aspects of oral discovery, turning it towards a more
discovery-biased procedure.
This Part concludes that the numerous changes that have been
proposed and adopted for deposition procedure have been focused on
symptoms—such as lawyer misconduct, delay, and obstruction—while
failing to address what is perhaps the underlying disease, the attempt to
mesh open fact-finding with an adversarial system of representation.  This
failure to get at the basic problem in the case of oral discovery contrasts
with recent Rules revisions providing for mandatory disclosure of certain
facts and documents.  The mandatory initial disclosure rules more directly
attempt to reconstruct the role of the lawyer in the discovery process.  The
failure to similarly revise the deposition rules is especially notable given the
fact that many lawyers consider depositions the most important discovery
tool and that depositions also often are a crucible for lawyer conflict,
bringing adverse parties into direct and spontaneous confrontations
generally far from the calming influence of judicial oversight.160
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your threatening letters to me.  But, you step outside this room and touch the telephone, and I’ll take care of
that in the way one does who has possessory rights.”);  A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions,
57 MD. L. REV. 273, 279 (1998);  A. Darby Dickerson, Deposition Dilemmas:  Vexatious Scheduling and Errata Sheets,
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 1-4 (1998) (“Depositions are an extensively used and rampantly abused discovery
tool.”) (collecting authority);  Kerper & Stuart, supra note 159, at 104;  Dan Downey, Discoverectomy, 11 REV.
LITIG. 475, 484 (1992) (“[D]epositions create the most fertile opportunity for lawyers to learn to despise each
other . . . . ”).  But cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2239 (1989) (arguing that discovery rule controversy centers on document
production);  Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal
Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998) (discussing a study of cases likely to have discovery, in which 67%
had at least one deposition, but problems with depositions were only reported in 26% of those cases that had
them, a lower percentage than problems with document discovery (44%), initial disclosure (37%), or expert
disclosure (27%)).
161. The contemporaneous objection rule of Rule 32 reads now as it did when introduced in 1938, save
for renumbering required by the 1970 reorganization of the discovery provisions of the Rules.  However, other
important changes have been made to discovery rules in the years since their promulgation that bear on
depositions.  These changes are the subject of the immediately following sections.
162. See discussion at Part II.C, supra.
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (1938) (modified 1970) (“Any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.”).
164. Id. (“[T]he deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party
or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of relevant facts.”).
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1948) (modified 1970).  FED. R. CIV. P. 26, advisory committee’s note to
subdivision (b) (1946) (citations omitted):
The amendments to subdivision (b) make clear the broad scope of examination and that it may
cover not only evidence for use at the trial but also inquiry into matters in themselves
Throughout the debate on deposition procedure modifications, the tension
between testimony-preservation-preferenced procedural deposition rules
and the Federal Rules’ stated goal of near-untrammeled discovery has not
been explored.
A.  Rule 26161
Although Rule 26 now contains “General Provisions Governing
Discovery” and mandatory disclosure provisions, in 1938 it set forth only
rules relating to depositions.  As discussed above,162 several provisions
were notable in the new Rule, among them those stating that the new
deposition procedure would serve dual purpose as a means of discovery
and preservation of evidence,163 and that the scope of the examination
could include the “claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim
or defense of any other party.”164  In 1948, the Advisory Committee added
to the provision on scope that:  “It is not ground for objection that the
testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”165
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inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery of such evidence.  The purpose of
discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which
may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case.  In such a preliminary inquiry
admissibility at trial should not be the test as to whether the information sought is within the
scope of proper examination.  Such a standard unnecessarily curtails the utility of discovery
practice.  Of course, matters entirely without bearing either as direct evidence or as leads to
evidence are not within the scope of inquiry, but to the extent that the examination develops
useful information, it functions successfully as an instrument of discovery, even if it produces
no testimony directly admissible . . . . Thus hearsay, while inadmissible itself, may suggest
testimony which properly may be proved.  Under Rule 26(b) several cases, however, have
erroneously limited discovery on the basis of admissibility, holding that the word “relevant’ in
effect meant “material and competent under the rules of evidence.”  Thus it has been said that
inquiry might not be made into statements or other matters which, when disclosed, amounted
only to hearsay.  The contrary and better view, however, has often been stated.
The 1948 amendments were adopted December 27, 1946, and took effect on March 19, 1948.
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1970).
167. Id.
168. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1980).
169. Id.
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983) (“Given our adversary tradition and the current
discovery rules, it is not surprising that there are many opportunities, if not incentives, for attorneys to engage
in discovery that, although authorized by the broad, permissive terms of the rules, nevertheless results in delay.”).
See also JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 30App.100 (3d ed. 1997) (“The most
significant amendments occurred in 1970 and 1993 and can be viewed as reflecting the tension inherent in Rule
30, the discovery rules, and modern American civil litigation.  The civil adjudication system is an adversary one
that permits substantial latitude to lawyers and seeks to permit maximum factfinding and attempts to get at ‘the
truth.’  Simultaneously, the system strives for efficiency and to ensure that litigation is not a war of attrition won
by excessively bellicose lawyering irrespective of the merits of the dispute.”) (further arguing that the 1970
changes opened up discovery while the 1993 changes were a “backlash” response that placed limits on
Substantial reorganization of the discovery rules took place in 1970.
Rule 26 was converted into “a rule concerned with discovery generally,”
by moving from Rule 26 provisions addressed exclusively to depositions.166
Thus, provisions in Rule 26 relating to when depositions could be taken
and the method of examination and cross-examination of deponents were
moved to Rule 30, while sections on the admissibility of depositions at trial
and in motion practice, and the grounds for objecting to such admissibility,
were moved to Rule 32.167
A new section was added to Rule 26 in 1980, in response to
“widespread criticism of abuse of discovery.”168  Rejecting proposals to
limit the scope of discovery, the Advisory Committee instead created a
provision allowing “counsel who has attempted without success to effect
with opposing counsel a reasonable program or plan for discovery” to seek
intervention of the court through a discovery conference.169
Discovery misuse remained on the Advisory Committee’s agenda, and
in 1983, the Committee made further revisions to Rule 26.  The
Committee for the first time recognized the tension between our adversary
system and the goal of “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties.”170  While recognizing that both excessive
1392 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
discovery).
171. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (1983) (stating:  “Excessive discovery and evasion or
resistance to reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems,” and “the spirit of the rules is violated
when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate
the issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive responses.”).
172. Id.
173. These “proportionality” provisions are now found in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2):
By order, the court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions and
interrogatories or the length of depositions under Rule 30.  By order or local rule, the court may
also limit the number of requests under Rule 36.  The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the court
if it determines that:  (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is
obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought;  or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the issues.  The court may act upon its own initiative after
reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(c).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
175. Among the many good articles on this topic, see, e.g., Subrin, supra note 19;  Rogelio A. Lasso,
Gladiators Be Gone:  The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Reexamination of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REV. 479, 485
(1995);  Schwarzer, supra note 156;  Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
176. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a).  But see Marcus, supra note 91, at 766 (arguing that the limit on initial disclosure
discovery and overly evasive responses were problems,171 the Committee
struck back at only the former, encouraging judges “to be more aggressive
in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.”172  It deleted a pre-
sumption that “the frequency of use” of the various discovery methods
was not to be limited, added provisions encouraging courts and parties to
consider the value of discovery in proportion to its cost,173 and added a
requirement that an attorney of record sign every “request, response, or
objection” to certify that it is consistent with the Rules, not interposed for
an improper purpose, and not “unreasonably or unduly burdensome or
expensive” given the needs of the case.174
Still, discovery abuse raged.  And a constant undercurrent in proposals
for discovery reform was a perceived decrease in civility, and increase in
adversarial behavior, among members of the practicing bar.  Several
commentators pointed out that an essential tension exists in a system that
requires from lawyers zealous advocacy of their clients, even during the
discovery phase of a case, while at the same time purporting to make all
non-privileged, relevant material available to all parties well before trial.175
Attempts to address this conflict between adversarial representation and
open discovery have made their furthest advance in the passage of the
1993, and later the 2000, amendments to Rule 26, requiring automatic
disclosure of certain documents and evidence in the initial stages of civil
litigation.176  For the first time, the Advisory Committee has taken steps to
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to material that “bears significantly on any claim or defense” is an attempt to narrow the general scope of
discovery, and pointing out how the other 1993 amendments to the Rules also seek “discovery containment”).
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 1993 advisory committee’s note (1993).  Much has been written about the 1993
revisions to Rule 26, and further revisions to mandatory disclosure made in 2000, that is interesting but too far
removed from our present project to include here.
178. See discussion at Part II.C, supra.
179. The motion to terminate is one of the few instances where the proposal set forth in this Article
would approve of witness’s counsel interrupting a deposition.  The original language of Rule 30(d) is well-stated:
“At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent and upon a showing
that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass,
or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the
deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition . . . .”  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (1938)
(modified 1993).
180. See Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, supra note 160, at 279-80 (“Before the 1993
amendments, Rule 30 was silent about how or what type of objections could be made, when a defending
attorney could instruct the witness not to answer, and the consequences if one side delayed or impeded the
examination.  Instead, the rule provided only that the court could terminate or limit the deposition when a party
change the adversarial nature of the discovery process, by imposing on the
parties a duty to disclose certain information without awaiting formal
discovery requests.177
The type of rule revision embodied by the automatic disclosure
provisions of Rule 26 strikes at the problem of adversarial behavior at its
root, by attempting to change the nature of the attorney’s relationship to
the case in the early stages of discovery.  The new Rule 26 takes away one
opportunity for obstruction by making certain facts virtually impervious
to concealment, or at least to concealment that was formerly allowed under
the rules and encouraged by the culture of adversary representation in
discovery.  Of course, no rule change can prevent outright fraudulent
suppression of information.  But the current Rule 26 requires lawyers to
forgo a round of potential discovery fights and make certain basic
information available immediately.
B.  Rule 30
As detailed above,178 in its 1938 promulgation, Rule 30 contained
provisions on notice, oaths, objections, and signing of depositions.  It also
included sections on protective orders and motions to terminate
examinations.179  Provisions on when depositions could be taken and the
method of examination and cross-examination of deponents were moved
from Rule 26 to Rule 30 in 1970.
In 1993, the Committee, as part of its overall revisions to the discovery
rules in response to perceived discovery abuse problems, for the first time
addressed the manner in which objections should be raised at
depositions.180  Stating that depositions “frequently have been unduly
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or deponent showed that the deposition was ‘being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably
to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party.’”).
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 30 advisory committee’s note to subdivision (d) (1993).
182. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (1993) (modified 2000).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2) (1993) (modified 2000).
184. The full text of current Rule 30(d) reads:
Schedule and Duration;  Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination.
(1)  Any objection during a deposition must be stated concisely and in a non-
argumentative and non-suggestive manner.  A person may instruct a deponent not to answer
only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation directed by the court, or to
present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).
(2)  Unless otherwise authorized by the court or stipulated by the parties, a deposition is
limited to one day of seven hours.  The court must allow additional time consistent with Rule
26(b)(2) if needed for a fair examination of the deponent or if the deponent or another person,
or other circumstance, impedes or delays the examination.
(3)  If the court finds that any impediment, delay, or other conduct has frustrated the fair
examination of the deponent, it may impose upon the persons responsible an appropriate
sanction, including the reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by any parties as a result
thereof.
(4)  At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and upon
a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the
action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition is being taken may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit
the scope and manner of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c).  If the order
made terminates the examination, it may be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court
in which the action is pending.  Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of
the deposition must be suspended for the time necessary to make a motion for an order.  The
provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
prolonged, if not unfairly frustrated, by lengthy objections and colloquy,
often suggesting how the deponent should respond,”181 the Committee
drafted a new requirement that:  “Any objection to evidence during a
deposition shall be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-
suggestive manner.  A party may instruct a deponent not to answer only
when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence
directed by the court, or to present a motion.”182  The 1993 revisions to
Rule 30 also put a limit of ten on the number of depositions parties may
take, absent leave of court or stipulation with the other parties, and made
clear that courts have the authority to establish limits on the length of
depositions.183
Revisions to Rule 30 in 2000 established a presumptive durational
limitation of one day (of seven hours) for any deposition, and strengthened
the provisions dealing with the manner in which objections are to be
raised, stating that “[i]f the court finds that any impediment, delay, or other
conduct has frustrated the fair examination of the deponent, it may impose
upon the persons responsible an appropriate sanction, including the
reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred by any parties as a result
thereof.”184
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FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d).
185. See Marcus, supra note 91, at 771-72 (discussing “Balkanization” of discovery rules through district
court experimentation);  see generally Kerper & Stuart, supra note 159, at 114-15 (collecting examples).
186. See Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, supra note 160, at 282-83 (collecting local rules
addressed at control deposition conduct);  see generally David H. Taylor, Rambo As Potted Plant: Local Rulemaking's
Preemptive Strike Against Witness-Coaching During Depositions, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1995).
187. 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
188. Id. at 526.
189. The full order reads:
AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 1993, upon consideration of the oral arguments and letter
briefs of the parties regarding the dispute over the conduct of counsel at depositions, it is
ORDERED that the following guidelines for discovery depositions are hereby imposed:
1. At the beginning of the deposition, deposing counsel shall instruct the witness to ask
deposing counsel, rather than the witness’s own counsel, for clarifications, definitions, or
Unlike the 1993 and 2000 revisions to Rule 26, revisions to Rule 30
during the same years did nothing to fundamentally change the relation-
ships between counsel during the discovery phase of civil litigation.  The
Rule 30 changes “tweak” the system without altering it, still supporting a
fully adversarial role for attorneys during discovery.
C.  Local Court Rules
During the post-1970 period of Rule revision, many federal courts also
were active in attempting to deal with perceived problems of deposition
abuse.185  A favorite target was attorney conduct during depositions,
particularly the conduct of the attorney representing the witness.186
One of the most widely reported cases from this era is Hall v. Clifton
Precision.187  In Clifton Precision, the court considered, among other issues, to
what extent a lawyer may “confer with a client, off the record and outside
earshot of the other lawyers, during a deposition of the client,” as well as
the proper manner of making objections and instructing a witness not to
answer a question.188  Citing the then-proposed 1993 amendments to Rule
30, along with the court’s authority under the Rules to control the pretrial
process, the court issued a broad-ranging order governing the behavior of
witness counsel at depositions and sharply limiting the ability of the
defending attorney to interrupt proceedings.  Among other things, the
order required that the witness “ask deposing counsel, rather than the
witness’s own counsel, for clarifications, definitions, or explanations of any
words, questions, or documents presented during the course of the
deposition;”  that witness counsel “not make objections or statements
which might suggest an answer to a witness;”  and that counsel “not direct
or request that a witness not answer a question, unless that counsel has
objected to the question on the ground that the answer is protected by a
privilege or a [court-ordered] limitation.”189  More controversially, the
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explanations of any words, questions, or documents presented during the course of the
deposition.  The witness shall abide by these instructions.
2. All objections, except those which would be waived if not made at the deposition
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(d)(3)(B), and those necessary to assert a privilege, to
enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d), shall be preserved.  Therefore, those objections need not
and shall not be made during the course of depositions.
3.  Counsel shall not direct or request that a witness not answer a question, unless that
counsel has objected to the question on the ground that the answer is protected by a privilege
or a limitation on evidence directed by the court.
4. Counsel shall not make objections or statements which might suggest an answer to
a witness.  Counsels’ statements when making objections should be succinct and verbally
economical, stating the basis of the objection and nothing more.
5. Counsel and their witness-clients shall not engage in private, off-the-record
conferences during depositions or during breaks or recesses, except for the purpose of deciding
whether to assert a privilege.
6. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5) are a
proper subject for inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any witness-
coaching and, if so, what.
7. Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, guideline (5) shall be
noted on the record by the counsel who participated in the conference.  The purpose and
outcome of the conference shall also be noted on the record.
8. Deposing counsel shall provide to the witness’s counsel a copy of all documents
shown to the witness during the deposition.  The copies shall be provided either before the
deposition begins or contemporaneously with the showing of each document to the witness.
The witness and the witness’s counsel do not have the right to discuss documents privately
before the witness answers questions about them.
9. Depositions shall otherwise be conducted in compliance with the Opinion which
accompanies this Order.
Id. at 531-32.
190. See Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions,  supra note 160, at 292 (collecting responses to
the Hall case and noting that the opinion “is controversial due to its strictness, and it is not followed in all
jurisdictions”).  For detailed criticism of the ruling, and similar rulings by other courts, see generally Taylor, supra
note 186.
court prohibited “private, off-the-record conferences during depositions
or during breaks or recesses, except for the purpose of deciding whether
to assert a privilege,” and ruled that the attorney-client privilege did not
apply to any such conferences conducted in violation of the order.190
Like the 1993 revisions to Rule 30, the Clifton Precision standing order,
and the many similar orders adopted by district courts around the country
following the Clifton Precision case, attempt to micromanage attorney
conduct.  But the cases stop short of recognizing that in a purely
investigatory proceeding, as civil depositions have essentially become,
witness counsel might fairly have no role beyond providing only the most
basic protection of witness privileges.
V.  FIRST, DO NO HARM:  CONSIDERING DEPOSITIONS TAKEN
WITHOUT THE “CONTEMPORANEOUS OBSTRUCTION” RULE
2004] CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTIONS 1397
191. Professor Paul D. Carrington, former Reporter for the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
suggested a similar revision in a 1997 article proposing possible revisions to the discovery rules, grounding the
proposed revision on practical rather than theoretical bases:
Rule 30 should be revised to create a presumptive limit on the number of depositions, and in
three other respects.  For one, it should be explicit that all objections to questions asked at a
deposition are automatically reserved, unless examining counsel otherwise directs.  The purpose
of this revision is to save the time of lawyers and deponents presently devoted to bickering over
the form of questions.  Absent such a non-waiver provision, the time limits on depositions will
be made inappropriate in a particular instance by prolonged bickering.  Counsel for the deponent
should, of course, be expected to assert applicable evidentiary privileges, but should otherwise
remain silent during the examination by other parties, unless the examining counsel wishes
assurance that a particular question and answer are in a form allowing them to be used at trial.
Carrington, supra note 153, at 66-68.
192. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. at 528.
Finally, a proposal:  eliminate the contemporaneous objection rule in
depositions.  Rather than requiring that objections as to form be made
during the deposition or else be waived, as per current Rule 32(d), and
allowing non-form objections to be made at deposition, despite the fact
that they are not waived, under Rule 30, we should preserve all objections
as to questions made during depositions and prohibit any objections from
being made at that time.  In the main, turn the defending attorney into a
potted plant.191
The deponent’s attorney would still have an important role, of course.
Not only during preparation of the witness, which is perhaps the most
important job of witness counsel even under present Rules, but also in
preserving privileges and protecting the witness from harassment.  These
would be the only proper times for deponent’s counsel to interrupt the
proceeding, which would become almost completely a colloquy between
witness and examining counsel.
For that is the role of the deposition in modern litigation:  finding out
what facts the witness knows, both to allow all parties to the case to have
the same information, preventing surprise in the event of trial, and to
“freeze” the witness’s testimony at an early point in the proceedings,
“before that witness’s recollection of the events at issue either has faded
or has been altered by intervening events, other discovery, or the helpful
suggestions of lawyers.”192  As discussed above, the chances of the
testimony ever being used at trial are small.  The proposed changes would
make the conduct of depositions more closely match the theory of oral
examination under the Rules.
Of course, there will be criticisms, several of which I anticipate below,
without attempting to be exhaustive.
A.  Protection of Deponents
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193. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.
194. Id.
195. See Kenneth E. Shore, A History of the 1999 Discovery Rules: The Debates & Compromises, 20 REV. LITIG.
89 (2000) (citation omitted) (quoting criticism, including “there are far more tricky questions than speaking
objections” and “the questioning attorney can sometimes phrase questions which mischaracterize testimony or
contort facts in such a way that any response to the question would be inaccurate or misleading . . . . [T]hese
provisions unfairly empower the questioning attorney in a deposition”).  See similar criticism of the Clifton
Precision decision in Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, supra note 160, at 292 n.98 (quoting Acri
v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., 142 Pitt. Legal J. 225 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Allegheny County 1994) (citations
omitted) (“[T]he court chose not to follow the Hall guidelines for a number of reasons:  (1) they prohibit counsel
for a party being deposed from raising objections that our discovery rules specifically allow;  (2) they provide
insufficient protection to the deponent;  (3) they can produce results that could not have been intended;  (4) they
fail to recognize the proper role of counsel;  (5) they increase the burden and expense of litigation;  and (6) they
are not necessary to curb the discovery abuses which are described in the Hall v. Clifton Precision opinion.  The
court further expounded: ‘It is my experience that more often than not intervention by counsel for the deponent
shortens the deposition by requiring the deposing counsel to focus on relevant matters and to allow the witness
to fully respond in the witness’s own language.  Depositions taken by certain attorneys would never end if other
counsel could not raise objections that the questions are repetitive or argumentative.  We need not turn the
lawyer for the deponent into a fly on the wall in order to protect litigants’ rights to obtain information from a
witness in a witness’s own language through depositions by oral examination.  If the misbehavior of the
deponent’s counsel becomes a recurring and serious problem, counsel for the de posing party can discontinue
the deposition and request judicial intervention.  As a discovery judge, I will review a transcript of the
discontinued deposition and if I agree with counsel for the deposing party that counsel for the deponent was
attempting to sabotage proper efforts to obtain discovery, I will tailor an order that will protect the interests of
the deposing party.’”).
196. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.5(f).
In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee undertook a
revision of the Texas rules of civil procedure, including the rules for
depositions.  One of the rules adopted as part of the revisions limits
objections during a deposition to “Objection, leading,” “Objection, form,”
and “Objection, nonresponsive;”  objections are waived if not made in
conformity with this rule.193  A lawyer making an objection can give a
broader reason for the objection only if opposing counsel requests an
explanation, and even then the explanation of the grounds for the
objection must be made clearly and concisely, in a non-argumentative and
non-suggestive manner.194
After publishing early drafts of this rule, the Texas Supreme Court
Advisory Committee, which drafted the rule, received complaints that the
proposed rule would not give deponent’s counsel the ability to protect a
witness from abusive conduct and misleading questions.195  In response,
the final rule was amended to allow deponent’s counsel to instruct the
witness not to answer a question in order “to preserve a privilege, comply
with a court order or these rules, protect a witness from an abusive
question or one for which any answer would be misleading, or secure a
ruling [on a motion to suspend the deposition].”196
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197. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. BROCKETT & JOHN W. KEKER, EFFECTIVE DIRECT & CROSS EXAMINATION
§ 9.19, at 192-93 (Calif. CEB 1986) (stating that “[t]he attorney defending a deposition should rarely conduct
direct examination of his own witness,” and listing exceptions).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3);  Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
As for the Texas rules that allow only bare objections as to form, leading
questions, and non-responsiveness:  why bother?  The opposing attorney
still gets to inject herself into the flow of examination, albeit in a starkly
worded fashion, and the objections themselves do little to preserve cleaner
testimony, if that is their purpose.  More importantly, while instructions
not to answer in the case of privilege, protective order, or abusive conduct
make sense, allowing instructions not to answer for a question “for which
any answer would be misleading” opens up an opportunity for a far more
disruptive practice than prior rules that arguably allowed “long-winded”
objections.
The solution, for our proposed rules and the Texas concerns, is the
same:  prohibit all objections, but preserve all of them for later
proceedings.  Allow instructions not to answer in the case of privilege,
protective order, or abusive conduct.  And for questions that are
potentially misleading, do nothing.  A solution for such questions is already
in place:  the deponent’s counsel may either rely on the ability to challenge
the misleading question at a later time, or may simply examine the
deponent following opposing counsel’s examination in order to clear up
any misleading statements.
The ramifications of this treatment of misleading questions are
important.  Encouraging direct examination by witness counsel to clear up
confused testimony will require witnesses, especially parties to the case, to
“put more cards on the table” than deponents normally wish to reveal.
For “friendly” witnesses, anyway, unless the witness is infirm or otherwise
likely to miss a potential trial, and a party thus needs the witness’s
testimony preserved, the party that intends to use the witness is generally
loath to examine that witness in deposition.197  Rather, the party will rely
on informal interviews to get a clear picture of the witness’s possible
testimony at trial.  Information gleaned through such interviews is, of
course, protected from discovery by opposing parties under the work
product doctrine.198  Should such information be needed prior to trial, for
example, to present or oppose a motion, the party can get the witness to
execute an affidavit containing the information.
Thus, under the current rules, a significant amount of information can
be legitimately and strategically concealed, while answers to allegedly
misleading questions are marked by contemporaneous objection but not
otherwise corrected.  Encouraging clarifying questions during the
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199. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(4) (“At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the
deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party, the court . . . may order the officer
conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner
of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c).”).
deposition itself, by eliminating the contemporaneous objection rule, could
lead to more extensive discovery.
If questions are intentionally misleading, at some point you reach
“abusive” conduct, and deponent’s counsel can terminate and move for a
protective order.199  But for routine misunderstandings, there is already a
corrective, one that does not require interruption of the flow of
examination.
B.  Use of Testimony in Dispositive Motions
Whether or not deposition testimony will be admissible to support or
oppose summary judgment motions is an important issue, especially for
defendants’ attorneys.  Still, a proposed elimination of the
contemporaneous objection rule does not greatly affect current practice.
Important issues of admissibility of testimony and other evidence will still
be briefed and argued in motion practice, as under the current rules.  By
not automatically waiving curable objections that are not raised during the
examination, our proposal will perhaps create more possibility for later
“kitchen sink” challenges to deposition testimony, but in cases that present
the economic incentive for such thorough motion practice, voluminous
objections are likely already being raised in depositions.
In fact, deponent’s counsel gets some positive tradeoff here for losing
the ability to interrupt the flow of examination:  she no longer need worry
about fixing opposing counsel’s questions in the deposition.  Rather, she
can let confusing, compound, and misleading questions stand on the
record.  If she is confident that the answers are inadmissible due to
infirmities in the original questions, then she need not clear up the
confusion with her own deposition examination of the witness.  Instead,
she can simply move to strike the answers if and when they are used to
support the opposing party’s summary judgment motion or opposition.
If the witness’s attorney is not confident that the answers will eventually
be stricken, then she may examine her own witness during the deposition
and clear up the error.
C.  Preservation of Testimony in Event of Trial
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200. In fact, the rule precludes making the argument against production of evidence in discovery on the
grounds that it might later be inadmissible at trial.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Relevant information need not
be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.”).
201. Compare Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions:  Controlling An Ethical Cancer In Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 561, 587 (1996) (“Although these blanket pretrial orders may restrict Rambo behavior, they may also
restrict effective and necessary representation of clients at a deposition.  For example, when a court prohibits
all objections except as to the form of the question and matters of privilege, attorneys who need to explain an
objection cannot do so.  If an individual and a corporation have both been sued, the attorney representing the
individual may want to object to the question, ‘When did you first learn of the discriminating act?’ in order to
clarify whether the question refers to the individual or the corporation.  However, under the wording of the
blanket pretrial order, his or her only option is to say, ‘Objection, vague.’  The opposing attorney and the
deponent may not understand the problem with the question.  Needless time will be wasted by all concerned,
pursuing a line of questions about which the client may have no knowledge, when a simple explanation by the
defending attorney would have clarified the situation.”).  The solution to Professor Cary’s quandary is to require
direct examination by witness counsel to clear up misunderstandings.
The framers of the Rules intended to create a dual-use deposition
procedure:  one that kept the original use of depositions as testimony-
preservation devices, and added a use as fact-discovery mechanisms.
Because so few cases go to trial, particularly of the discovery-intensive
commercial type that often settle or are disposed of in the pretrial stages,
the preservation of testimony is no longer as important as when the Rules
were drafted.  But some trials do happen, of course, and deposition
testimony might need to be offered at trial due to unavailability of a
witness.
But consider upon whom the burden should rest for preserving this
evidence—the deposing attorney, who is most likely to need the testimony
later, or the defending attorney, who has the ability to secure evidence
from the witness through informal avenues?  Should not the burden be on
the proponent of using the evidence to collect admissible information by
asking proper questions?  It is his burden in all other aspects of litigation.
For example, an attorney who will eventually challenge the admission of
a certain document produced in discovery is not required to argue at the
time of production that the document is not going to be admissible at
trial.200  So why should witness counsel be responsible for policing the
subsequent admissibility of deposition testimony?
Of course, witness counsel always has the right to examine her own
witness at deposition to insure that certain testimony will be preserved in
admissible form.  While this is a departure from current common practice,
in that information might be revealed at an earlier stage of litigation, such
a result is perfectly consistent with a discovery procedure that aspires to
full knowledge for all parties of all relevant facts.201
As with summary judgment motions, there will be post-deposition, pre-
trial motion practice to resolve evidentiary issues, including the admissi-
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202. The final pretrial conference currently authorized by Rule 16 specifies that the parties “shall
formulate a plan for trial, including a program for facilitating the admission of evidence.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(d).
bility of deposition testimony.202  As discussed above, witness counsel gets
a tradeoff here for no longer being able to interrupt examinations with
objections:  she now has the ability to subsequently challenge the
admissibility of deposition testimony without regard to whether objections
were preserved during the examination.
VI.  CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that the contemporaneous objection rule for
depositions is a vestige of pre-Rules common law, more suited to the use
of depositions as a testimony-preservation, rather than a fact-discovery,
device.  Given that the rule can be used to impede examinations, and that
the testimony-preservation function for depositions is nearly irrelevant in
current civil practice, it should be discarded.  This conclusion is supported
by considering alternative investigatory fora, many of which have far more
restricted roles for witness counsel than does our current civil system.
In rejecting the “contemporaneous obstruction” rule, and bringing
examination practice under the Rules into conformity with the open-
discovery theory underlying them, the proposal envisions a less adversarial
role for attorneys in the discovery process.  Such a role has been
embraced, somewhat, under the current Rules’ mandatory initial disclosure
provisions, but not yet for deposition practice.  In directly addressing the
disconnect that has given obstructionist attorneys a tool for impeding
discovery, this proposal provides theoretical underpinnings, and a push
forward, to the efforts of the last decade to decrease adversarialness in the
pretrial process.
